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BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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306<br />

CAUSALITY <strong>AND</strong> COMMON SENSE PHYSICS<br />

the question of how we may describe or understand the embodied<br />

practice of apprehension. 24<br />

Kant’s theory of the categories of modality concerns how a certain<br />

aspect of our world is present in time (A 145/B 184). The most<br />

significant aspect of this theory, I think, is the distinction between<br />

necessity and contingency. As necessity is an essential mark of a priori<br />

knowledge and contingency is a mark of the empirical content of<br />

knowledge, the distinction plays a very significant role in Kant’s<br />

transcendental philosophy. In defining yet another major task of the<br />

Critique, one might say that Kant’s transcendental philosophy,<br />

considered as a whole, aims at making clear exactly how this distinction<br />

relates to our knowledge of the world. More specifically, it aims at<br />

answering the question of how it is possible to have knowledge about the<br />

world that is necessarily true and universal. As this question underlies<br />

Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a whole, however, it is unlikely that<br />

it can be answered by identifying the categories of modality with a<br />

certain group of practices, embodied or not. What may be argued,<br />

however, as I have done, is that knowledge about the world that is<br />

necessarily true and universal can be seen as originating in embodied<br />

practices. Going further into Kant’s theory of the categories of modality<br />

at this point, would not, I think, add much to what has already been said.<br />

11.9 Summary<br />

The aim of this and the previous chapters was to explore whether it was<br />

possible to interpret the relational categories, as they are described in the<br />

Critique, as embodied practices. I conclude that it is. Let me remind the<br />

reader, however, that in making this claim, I have followed a path of<br />

investigation that I think was probably not of much interest to Kant in<br />

the Critique. However, as I have said, my investigation has not been<br />

motivated by Kant’s main interest in the Critique but by a desire to look<br />

beyond or behind the abstract theory of this text to see what may have<br />

been omitted from it either accidentally or deliberately.<br />

24 It may at most be seen as a sort of supplement to what was said above, when I<br />

claimed that the cognitive subject in an act of empirical apprehension is always<br />

affected and that this affection produces a sensation. In his theory of the category<br />

of quality, Kant says that we can know a priori that this sensation has an intensity<br />

lying somewhere between something and zero.

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