BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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THE BODY IN THE CRITIQUE
in which the reflections of the Critique proceed. As suggested by authors
such as Munzel and Pitte, 2 I will take this anthropology to be present not
only in the Anthropology and in Kant’s unpublished lectures in this field,
but also in passages found in his writings on pedagogy and logic, and
even in some other texts discussing man and his position in the world,
such as On the common saying, Directions in space and Orientation. A
basic idea of this interpretative approach is that parts of the Critique may
be read as a series of reflections based on the idea that the mind is
embodied in the sense suggested in the first part of this work.
First, however, I will discuss some preliminary questions concerning
Kant’s intellectual development and the perspective under which his
critical reflections took place. I will also briefly discuss some of the main
trends in the interpretation of the Critique and locate my own position
relative to them. As a rule, decisive arguments in favor of my position will
be left for the following chapters.
4.1 The Critique – a brief presentation
The Critique is a notoriously difficult book, and today, more than two
hundred years after its first publication, we are still far from reaching an
agreement on how best to interpret it. As numerous commentators have
pointed out, in content as well as in style, the text represents a
tremendous challenge to the philosophical scholar.
First a brief outline of the book itself. Even if Kant is not
unambiguously clear about the main purpose of the book, 3 he more than
once announces that its aim is to answer the question ‘How is synthetic a
priori knowledge possible?’ The Kantian notion of synthetic a priori
knowledge refers to a knowledge that is necessarily true and universal
and which is concerned not with conceptual or analytic knowledge but
the basic structure of experience. Examples of synthetic a priori
knowledge are, according to Kant, found in Euclidean geometry and
Newtonian physics. Thus, one way to paraphrase the basic question of
the Critique is ‘How is the knowledge represented by these sciences
possible?’
‘Knowledge’ in these questions means objective knowledge, so as
Kant also explicitly stresses, the main task of the Critique is not to
2
Cf. Munzel (1999) and Pitte (1971 and 1978). Cf. also Mengüsoglu (1966), 109.
3
Noting how Kant’s statements in this field often diverge Pippin (1992), 286
complains that this text suffers perhaps more than any other of Kant’s texts from
numerous, varied, and not always consistent characterizations of its central
purpose, or fundamental problem.