BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

THE BODY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL 223
we have already seen, a number of commentators have put forward what
I have called a life-world perspective according to which Kant’s
transcendental philosophy involves a philosophical reflection taking place
within the human life-world as we know it. I would argue that this is also
the case where Kant’s transcendental idealism is concerned: Kant’s
transcendental idealism follows from a line of reflection in which the
embodied nature of human cognition is a basic premise. By adopting this
interpretation, we may maintain both the basic doctrines of Kant’s
transcendental idealism, and at the same time contend that Kant’s theory
of embodied cognition is a legitimate part of transcendental philosophy. 13
I shall shortly present my interpretation in more detail, and argue
why I think it should be preferred. This will also be my way of
responding to those who argue that references to the body have no place
in Kant’s transcendental idealism, for instance by pointing at the
problems (or apparent problems) we have investigated in this section. My
strategy is not to argue directly against this position, but rather to argue
that another and better reading of Kant is available. Indirectly, however,
this strategy of course also involves a criticism of earlier interpreters such
as Strawson because it implies that their reading of the Critique misses
some rather essential points.
As a final point before continuing, let me state that I am aware that
Kant claims to have followed more than one way leading to
transcendental idealism, one starting from the antinomies, another from
the a priori nature of geometry. The way emphasized in this chapter is
perhaps not the only one leading to a transcendental idealism of a
Kantian sort but it is a way that I take to be fundamental. With this in
mind, let us proceed.
7.5 From the empirical to the transcendental
I have suggested that Kant’s transcendental philosophy in general
involves philosophical reflection taking place within the human life-world
as we know it, and that Kant’s transcendental idealism is a product of
this reflection. More specifically, I shall now argue that Kant’s
transcendental idealism is the product of a reflection having as its starting
13 Only at one point within his transcendental reflection does Kant point beyond
the empirical world, I think. This is when he defines the general notion of a thing
in itself. However, I agree with those arguing that this notion is used only
negatively, as denoting that in an object that cannot be known. Thus, properly
understood, the term refers to the limit of our knowledge, and does not imply
that Kant attempted to cross this limit.