BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

THE EMBODIED MIND
seems not to be a dualist theory. Rather, it appears remarkably similar to
the one I suggested was already present in 1747. It involves the idea that
a human is not two substances, but one substance. 97 We now learn that
this substance may appear in various forms depending on the perspective
established. From the perspective characteristic of the outer sense, for
instance, human beings appear as extended in space. From another
perspective, for instance the perspective established when we talk about a
human being as it exists in itself, extension is no longer an issue.
However, the different perspectives do not present different things or
substances to us. In each and every case there is only one substance
present. Only the way we see it, or conceive of it, changes. The same
point is maintained when man is considered as a thinking being. It is not
this or that part or aspect of man that thinks. It is man, considered as a
unity, i.e. as one substance, that thinks. Again, what we may observe
about this thinking being, or how we may conceive of it, changes
according to the perspective taken. From the perspective characteristic of
the outer sense, for instance, we cannot see thoughts as such. However,
we can see the signs of thoughts.
Due to the brief character of Kant’s remarks, it is difficult to elaborate
further the theory implied here. I would also stress that, whatever it is,
what he is putting forward is nothing more than an hypothesis. He does
not claim that it represents proper knowledge. The only explicit
argument given in its favor is that it does not contradict our experience
or transcendental philosophy. Still, there seems to be a strong underlying
message in the passages just examined that thinking is an activity
involving not only a certain hidden or even immaterial part of man. It
involves the whole human being, body and mind included. In the
second part of this work, I shall discuss how Kant further develops this
idea.
1.14 The virtual presence of the mind
Let us now return to the Inaugural dissertation and its claim that the
mind [Seele] is virtually present in the body. How are we to understand
this claim? The idea of the virtual presence of the mind in the body is
introduced in the Inaugural dissertation as part of a more general
discussion of the immaterial [Unstofflichen] and its relation to matter. All
97
Cf. A 359 where Kant says ‘and thus I can also assume that in the substance in
itself to which extension pertains in respect of our outer sense, thoughts may also
be present, which may be represented with consciousness through their own
inner sense.’ (My emphasis.)
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