BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

SPATIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE BODY IN THE CRITIQUE 161
At the beginning of the Transcendental aesthetic, ‘sensibility’ is
defined as the capacity to be affected.
The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way
in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. (A 19/B 33) 8
At A 19/B 33 sensibility is also defined as the origin of our intuitions
[Anschauungen]. All intuitions have two aspects, Kant further explains,
one is the immediate effect of an object affecting the mind and is called
sensation [Empfindung] (A 19-20/B 34). The other is what he refers to as
the pure form of intuition. This term refers to the Kantian idea that the
empirical content of cognition is intuited in certain temporal and spatial
relations, which are claimed to exist a priori in the mind (A 20/B 34). In
the Critique the notion of sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] includes both these
aspects, both sensation, which is also called the matter of an intuition,
and its a priori form or forms, namely time and space. In the
Transcendental aesthetic both aspects are paid due attention.
Does this theory also include the notion of an active mind? This
seems to be clearly refuted by Kant’s definition of sensibility at A 19/B
33. Here, the defining character of sensibility seems to be receptivity
alone. This seems to exclude the idea that having intuitions presupposes
activity. This interpretation also seems to be supported by the fact that at
this point Kant seems to ascribe all activity and spontaneity to the
understanding. And as sensibility and understanding are described as
heterogeneous faculties, this seems to exclude the idea that our intuitions,
which originate in sensibility, presuppose activity. However, rather than
being the final truth, this is, I will argue, no more than an initial
approach to a more comprehensive theory of intuition. As we read more
of the text, the idea that having intuitions presupposes the activity of the
mind becomes gradually more explicit.
A first indication of this idea is found in Kant’s claim that the form of
an intuition is supplied by the mind. By stating the point in this way,
using the term ‘to supply’, a weak suggestion is made that the form of an
intuition does in fact presuppose some kind of activity. A more
explicit reference to activity is found at A 20/B 34 where Kant
introduces the concept of an ‘appearance’ [Erscheinung], defined as ‘the
8 This definition, or equivalents to it, is also found at other places in the Critique,
cf. e.g. A 44/B 61 and A 51/B 75.