BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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perspective that has to be kept separate from the perspectives
characterizing the writings published prior to the Critique, as well as
later publications such as the Anthropology or On pedagogy. A
proponent of this kind of criticism may, for instance, claim that the
critical perspective is to be contrasted with the dogmatic perspective of
Kant’s pre-critical period, as well as the empirical perspective of, for
instance, his writings on anthropology and pedagogy. Moreover, she may
claim that texts written under such different perspectives have little or no
reciprocal relevance.
Kant may himself be seen as fuelling such claims through his frequent
denunciations of his early writings. He publicly claimed his early
investigations to be metaphysical and thus untenable, and he discouraged
his students from reading them. He also urged his publisher to exclude
them from a collection of his works. 4 By doing so he himself contributed
to the idea that among his publications the Critique is vital for every
student of philosophy and may be understood on its own terms, but the
works preceding it are relevant for antiquarians at best.
It is well known that an author is not always the best guide for an
interpreter and even if the superior status of the Critique is unchallenged,
many scholars have maintained that, contrary to what Kant suggests, it
may well be interpreted in the light of his earlier works. As for his
intellectual development, there is a growing awareness that ideas and
perspectives central to the Critique are also present in texts published
much earlier, even prior to the Inaugural dissertation of 1770. This has
typically been claimed to be the year of Kant’s critical turn, leading
eventually towards the fully developed critical position of the Critique. 5
Even if the Inaugural dissertation represents a decisive step in his
intellectual development, its significance should not be over-emphasized.
Schmucker argues, for instance, that in texts published as early as in the
1760s Kant was developing ideas that to some extent corresponded to
the critical position of the 1780s. 6 Schmucker refers to his skepticism
regarding metaphysical proofs of the immateriality of the human mind,
4
THE BODY IN THE CRITIQUE
In a letter to Tieftrunk he recommended that nothing before the Inaugural
dissertation should be included, cf. Zammito (2002), 257 and also Schönfeld
(2000), 6.
5
The turning point is then typically associated with Kant’s denouncement of the
doctrine that time and space are objective things or features of things, arguing
instead that time and space are subjective forms of intuition, cf. e.g. Falkenburg
(2000), 134.
6
Schmucker (1981), 1ff.