BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

THE BODY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL 237
I think that much of my knowledge of myself as an embodied being
has to be given up when I establish the theoretical perspective just
suggested. I have to give up all parts of this knowledge that is based on
observation from outside the body, such as when I observe my arm on
the table in front of me now. I have to give up, for instance, my
knowledge of the color of my skin and my eyes, as well as my knowledge
of the exact constitution of my organs, including my sense organs. Even if
all this is given up, however, something, I think, remains, namely, that I,
as a conscious mind, inhabit a space within a certain boundary. Thus, I
know myself as a being in space. 22 I also know myself as a being with the
capacity to move in space, as a being with the potential for being acted
upon, and with a potential for acting upon other beings. Whether I am
justified in referring to this spatial being that I am as a body may be a
matter for discussion. If we define a body in a minimal sense, however, as
a being endowed with consciousness, extended in space and with the
capacity to act and being acted upon, then I am also justified in saying
that my mind inhabits a body in the sense just specified.
Whether Kant would have agreed to this argument or not, I do not
know. He might have pointed out that there are other arguments
favoring the idea that the mind is embodied in the sense just specified as
well, such as the one suggested in my analysis of the schematism chapter;
that cognition of objects in space presupposes that we exist in space with
the capacity to interact with these objects. Or he might have insisted that
the fact that we are embodied beings (at least in this life) is such an
obvious fact that there is no point in denying it. Regardless of the
underlying argument, however, I think that Kant would have insisted
that his transcendental philosophy presupposes the notion of human
embodiment in the way specified. Moreover, I think that this notion is a
basic element of Kant’s anti-skeptical strategy, as I shall try to show.
Let us take a look at Kant’s refutation of the skepticism of Descartes
and Hume in the A-version of the paralogism chapter. Kant here fights
what he diagnoses as skeptical idealism, that is, the position claiming that
the existence of objects in space is doubtful, which he ascribes to both
Descartes and Hume. This skepticism, he argues, arises from the
assumption that the mind is the only thing of which we have immediate
awareness, i.e., sensation. This is in itself no bad assumption, according
to Kant. In fact, it is also his own position:
22 At least, this follows if we accept that we have an immediate awareness of the
spatial relations within our body, as Kant contends in Directions in space and
Orientation.