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BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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SPATIAL SCHEMATISM 191<br />

interpretation, for instance, when Kant describes a person with a vivid<br />

imagination who believes he is seeing before him what is actually only in<br />

his head.<br />

The illusion caused by the strength of our imagination often goes so<br />

far that we think we see and feel outside us what is only in our mind<br />

[Kopf]. 30<br />

My point is, however, is that when ‘imagination’ refers to the mental<br />

domain, this is only part of the meaning it has in the Kantian corpus at<br />

large. In its broader sense, it refers to the human capacity for image<br />

production in general. This means that the imagination is at play<br />

whenever a person uses her body to create images or image-like<br />

structures. As for Kant’s theory of schematism, I think ‘imagination’<br />

should be understood here in this extended sense. 31 So the fact that in the<br />

schematism chapter Kant associates schematism and imagination does<br />

not exclude the notion of embodied practices from the theory. On the<br />

contrary, in the geometry example I take the term ‘schema of the<br />

triangle’ to refer to any practice by which a triangle is constructed, such<br />

as the drawing of a triangle on a piece of paper, on the blackboard, in the<br />

sand, or perhaps even in the air, as when a person draws an imaginary<br />

triangle in the air with his hand. I shall also argue that only if we<br />

understand ‘schema’ in this way is Kant capable of solving the question<br />

he opens the schematism chapter with.<br />

30 Ak VII: 178.<br />

31 Kaulbach (1968) comes close to the same conclusion. When ‘imagination’ is<br />

used by Kant in an epistemic context, it corresponds to the capacity of embodied<br />

image production. To Kaulbach, this insight follows immediately from Kant’s<br />

thesis of the emboidied self: ‘Daß das Subjekt, welches beschreibend seine<br />

ursprüngliche Einbildungskraft ins Werk setzt, ein leibliches Wesen sein muss,<br />

resultiert aus dem Gedanken, daß Beschreibung, die mit seinsbildendem<br />

Anspruch auftritt, eine die Figuren produzierende Kraft aufbieten muss. Das<br />

beschreibende Subjekt muß die ursprungliche Kraft haben, durch eine Handlung<br />

des Ausdehnens den Raum figürlich zu bestimmen, ihn zu ‘beschreiben’, wie<br />

man eine bisher leere Tafel beschreibt. Kraft bedeutet hier wie auch anderwärts<br />

dasjenige Vermögen des Subjekts, sich als unausgedehntes Wesen raumbildend<br />

auseinanderzulegen, dadurch erst einen figurierten Raum hervorzubringen.’<br />

(Kaulbach (1968), 285.)

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