BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

220
THE BODY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL
But ‘I am simple’ signifies no more than that this representation ‘I’
encompasses not the least manifoldness within itself, and that it is an
absolute (though merely logical) unity. (A 355)
I will not try to decide here which of the above descriptions best covers
Kant’s point but I will simply repeat what I take to be his basic agenda in
these passages. In analyzing self-consciousness, we never leave the field of
our representations, so there is no way in which transcendental
apperception may be used as a premise from which we may deduce what
a human subject is qua thing in itself. A few pages later, Kant refers to
this unknown and unknowable subject as ‘the transcendental subject’ (A
356). 9
As I see it, Kant’s concept of the transcendental subject is a clear
parallel to his concept of a thing in itself. Just as our empirical
representation of an object does not tell us the whole truth about what
such an object is, so, according to Kant, analyzing our representations
does not tell us the whole truth about who we are considered as thinking
beings. In both cases, there remains something unknown that will forever
remain beyond the reach of human knowledge. 10
7.4 The unknown origin of affection
How does Kant’s theory of embodied cognition, which I claim is implied
and presupposed by the abstract discourse of the Critique, fit with Kant's
transcendental idealism? As was suggested in the introduction to this
chapter, there are problems involved in trying to combine these two
perspectives. In this section I shall take a closer look at these problems,
and then argue how they may be overcome. Let me start by focusing on
Kant’s idea that sensation involves affection.
According to Kant’s theory of embodied cognition (cf. e.g. the
Anthropology), all sensation involves the body being affected directly or
indirectly by physical objects. According to the transcendental idealism of
the Critique we are justified, as part of an empirical psychology, in
9
See also A 354, A 355, A 381 and A 382.
10
This I also take to be Allison’s point (1983), 287 when he writes: ‘The Critique
contains two distinct and incompatible doctrines about the relation between the
subject of apperception and the noumenal self. According to one, which is Kant’s
official position, the subject of apperception is identified simply with the
noumenal or ‘real’ self. According to the other, which I take to express Kant’s
deepest view, the subject of apperception is distinguished from the noumenal self,
indeed, from any kind of intelligible object.
‘