BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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implication we end up with the three principles defining Kant’s
pragmatic theory of embodied rationality:
1) A person may possess a concept solely through the successful
performance of an embodied practice.
2) Such a concept may also be possessed in abstracto, that is, in
abstraction from its corresponding practice.
3) In such a case the practice has ontological and pragmatic
priority over the abstract concept.
The third point has now been extended, as pragmatic priority has been
added to ontological priority. Together with my above definitions of
‘practice’ and ‘pragmatic’, we have now reached what I consider to be
the final formulation of Kant’s pragmatic theory of embodied rationality.
Before we leave these passages, we may notice that Kant, echoing the
advice from On pedagogy, also demands that we make explicit the
concepts corresponding to our practices. No one can claim to be a real
professional without knowing in abstracto the concepts according to
which his practice takes place. For one thing, only a person capable of
presenting his knowledge systematically in general propositions would be
able to function as a teacher. Also, only on the basis of such knowledge
may the professional carry out effective new experiments and thereby
expand his theory. Here is the relevant passage:
Thus no one can pretend to be practically proficient in a science and
yet scorn theory without declaring that he is an ignoramus in his field,
inasmuch as he believes that by groping about in experiments and
experiences, without putting together certain principles (which really
constitute what is called theory) and without having thought out some
whole relevant to his business (which, if one proceeds methodically in
it, is called a system), he can get further than theory could take him. 92
Far from inviting a hostile attitude towards theoretical knowledge, Kant
advises the professional to reflect consciously on his practice, or, to use
Kant’s own expression, abstract from his practice the concepts according
to which this practice is performed.
3.13 Some modern parallels
Earlier I mentioned some possible explanations as to why Kant’s
pragmatic theory of embodied rationality has been so little noticed. The
above discussion may perhaps serve as an illustration of one of the
92
Ak VIII: 275-6.
RATIONALITY AND EMBODIED PRACTICE