BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

SPATIAL SCHEMATISM 203
Indirectly the notion of obscure representations is also implied, I
think, by the idea, generally advanced in the Critique that consciousness
comes in degrees. This idea is mentioned in the main text, just before the
footnote:
For even consciousness always has a degree, which can always be
diminished. (B 415)
This idea is also put forward, for example, at A 175/B 217. In a passage
dealing with empirical consciousness in relation to inner sense, Kant
explains that this consciousness may vary in degree from zero upwards. 48
Several passages in the Critique also suggest that parts of the cognitive
process may take place with little consciousness. A central passage in this
respect is where Kant introduces the synthetic power of the imagination,
a blind force we constantly apply but normally without explicit
consciousness (A 78/B 103). A similar point is stated somewhat later,
arguing that all synthesis is a product of the representative faculty, he
adds that this may be either conscious or unconscious (B 130). It may be
confusing that Kant says that the synthetic acts of the understanding are
sometimes not conscious, and if I was right earlier then no thinking, and
so no synthesis, can take place without consciousness. However, I think
that Kant is talking here about what we, following the distinction made
at B 414-415, may call obscure consciousness, and the same applies in
other cases in the Critique when he refers to unconscious cognition.
Kant’s idea that consciousness comes in degrees, can also, without
difficulty, be applied to embodied acts or practices. Interestingly, the
Critique contains at least one example that deals explicitly with an
embodied act that is performed at an obscure level of consciousness.
Actually, this example occurs in the same footnote where the notion of
an obscure representation is defined. The example describes the
improvisations of a musician (B 415). At some level the musician has to
be aware of what he is doing, Kant argues, or else he could not produce
music. More precisely, without consciousness he could not make the
connections and distinctions that are needed in order to produce music.
However, he cannot possibly have his attention focused on every single
movement of his fingers. Thus, the rapid movements of his fingers are
deliberately produced and accompanied with consciousness, but on an
obscure level, so that when later asked to describe these movements, he
would most likely be unable to do so.
48 A 175/B 217. Cf. also B 208