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BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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166<br />

SPATIAL EXPERIENCE <strong>AND</strong> THE <strong>BODY</strong> <strong>IN</strong> THE CRITIQUE<br />

A 99 we learn, for instance, that the a priori representations of time and<br />

space presuppose the synthesis of apprehension:<br />

Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori,<br />

i.e., in regard to representations that are not empirical. For without it<br />

we could have a priori neither the representations of space nor of<br />

time, since these can be generated [erzeugt] only through the<br />

synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its original receptivity<br />

provides. (A 99, my emphasis)<br />

Without the activity of the mind, that is, without the synthesis of<br />

apprehension, no a priori representation of time and space would exist,<br />

Kant claims.<br />

5.7 Reproduction<br />

That the a priori representations of time and space presuppose activity is<br />

further emphasized by the section beginning at A 100. This paragraph<br />

concerns what Kant calls the reproductive synthesis of imagination. One<br />

of the examples he uses to explain this kind of synthesis is the drawing of<br />

a line in thought. Here is the relevant passage:<br />

Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time<br />

from one noon to the next, or even want to represent a certain<br />

number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold<br />

representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to<br />

lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the<br />

preceding parts of time, or the successively represented units) from<br />

my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following<br />

ones, then no whole representation and none of the previously<br />

mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental<br />

representations [Grundvorstellungen] of space and time, could ever<br />

arise [entspringen können]. (A 102)<br />

Kant seems to presuppose here that no object is ever presented to us qua<br />

object by the senses. What is presented to us is nothing but a manifold.<br />

He does not tell us exactly how we are to conceive of this manifold.<br />

However, let us, like him, use a line as our example, and let us assume<br />

that the manifold of the line consists of the infinite number of points by<br />

which the line is formed. 12 His point then seems to be something like this.<br />

12<br />

This does not mean that I want to turn Kant into a kind of sense impression<br />

atomist. Considered transcendentally, the line is not the sum of an infinite

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