BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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another to human behavior is also maintained by Kaulbach, Kambartel,
Melnick and Saugstad. Kaulbach suggests that Kant’s transcendental
philosophy may be interpreted as a theory referring to the self-conscious
movements of an embodied subject. These movements have a
transcendental function and are thus a legitimate part of transcendental
philosophy. 44
Kambartel argues that Kant’s theory of the categories may
be seen as referring to embodied practices. 45 Melnick defends the idea
both that the Kantian notions of space and time refer to embodied acts,
and that the categories are forms of embodied behavior. 46 Saugstad has
argued in a series of papers that the notion of embodied practices has a
central place in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and defends what he
calls an ‘externalist’ interpretation of Kant. 47 This interpretation is
contrasted with what he calls an ‘internalist’ interpretation, which he says
has been the dominant trend in traditional Kant interpretation. He
describes his externalist view as follows:
On this reading, Kant’s position is that human knowledge depends,
ultimately, upon our ability to perform a fixed set of overt actions
essentially involving the movement of the human body. 48
Saugstad emphasizes that he does not intend to transform Kant into
some kind of behaviorist and so admits a place for inner mental
experiences in Kant’s theory. However, these are not given any
privileged significance. I will return to Saugstad’s interpretation later.
That the notion of embodied acts or practices is implied by certain
passages of the Critique, whether Kant was aware of it or not, is also
suggested by Aquila, 49 Caygill, 50 Rossvær, 51 and Gibbons. 52 Brook and
44
Cf. e.g. Kaulbach (1968), 258 and 285, and also Kaulbach (1960, 1965 and
1968).
45
Cf e.g. Kambartel (1976), 117.
46
Melnick (1989).
47
Saugstad (1982, 1986, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 2000 and 2002).
48
Saugstad (1992), 381.
49
Cf. e.g. Aquila (1992), 162ff.
50
In his Kant Dictionary Caygill claims that the idea of embodied experience is
presupposed in the more abstract analyses of the Critique. He writes: ‘Thus the
analysis of the experience of the human body is implied through the more
technical theoretical analyses of CPR.’ Cf. Caygill (1995), 96.
51
Rossvær (1974).
52
Gibbons (1994).
THE BODY IN THE CRITIQUE