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BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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7. THE <strong>BODY</strong> <strong>AND</strong> THE TRANSCENDENTAL<br />

The difference between the transcendental and<br />

the empirical therefore belongs only to the<br />

critique of cognitions [Erkenntnisse] and does not<br />

concern their relation to their object.<br />

From the Critique 1<br />

I have argued that Kant’s theory of cognition in the Critique may be<br />

read, at least in part, as referring to embodied acts and events. For<br />

instance, I have argued that when he says that the empirical content of<br />

our intuitions originates in the affection of the mind, then the mind in<br />

question has to be conceived of as an embodied mind, and what Kant<br />

refers to by the term ‘affection’ should be understood as the affection of<br />

the physical senses of the body. I have also argued that when Kant says<br />

that space and time qua forms of intuition are produced by the mind's<br />

activity, this is the embodied activity of an embodied mind. I have even<br />

argued that his theory of subsumption under concepts in the schematism<br />

chapter may be read as a theory referring to embodied practices. In the<br />

following I will refer to all this as ‘Kant’s theory of embodied cognition’.<br />

When claims like this are put forward, two objections are typically<br />

raised, both having to do with the distinction between the empirical and<br />

the transcendental. The first objection relates to the epistemic project of<br />

the Critique and involves the claim that our knowledge of the body is<br />

empirical, and that empirical observation cannot support the a priori<br />

claims of transcendental philosophy. I shall discuss this objection in a<br />

later chapter. In this chapter I shall discuss another potential objection to<br />

the above interpretation. It may be stated like this. In the Critique Kant<br />

establishes a transcendental philosophy, and along with this a<br />

transcendental perspective. This perspective is to be kept sharply distinct<br />

from an empirical perspective, the perspective we use to describe the<br />

empirical world. And even if the task of transcendental philosophy is to<br />

answer how it is possible to have objective knowledge of the empirical<br />

world, transcendental philosophy itself is not about this world. This,<br />

again, means that we cannot take the concepts of transcendental<br />

1<br />

A 55/B 81.

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