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2005 - 2006 - Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2012

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GUINEA PART 2: COUNTRY ANALYSIS<br />

Freshwater<br />

Annual availability (1998) 226.0km 3<br />

Per capita 29,454m 3<br />

Annual withdrawal (1987) 0.74km 3<br />

Domestic 10%<br />

Industrial 3%<br />

Agriculture 87%<br />

Operations and actualities<br />

Fees collected by SEEG go towards paying service providers, covering distribution costs and for<br />

operations and investments carried out on behalf of the facilities owner (SONEG). SEEG began<br />

operations against a backdrop of severe water shortage and a network in a poor state of repair, along<br />

with some cultural difficulties. For example, a profit-oriented company needed to be developed, and<br />

customers had to be educated about the qualities of drinking water, how to avoid wasting water and<br />

why water had to be paid for.<br />

The performance of the contract to date has been mixed. Between 1989 and 1995, the cost of water<br />

rose first from US$0.12/m 3 to US$0.25/m 3 at the start of the contract and progressively to US$0.90/m 3<br />

then falling back to US$0.66 per m 3 by 2000. In 1989, 15% of urban dwellers had access to piped<br />

water. This had increased to 52% by 1996. Meanwhile, water connections increased from 8,500 in<br />

1975 to 12,000 in 1989 and to 30,500 by 1995. Metering also increased from about 5% to 98% of all<br />

connections by 2000. The bill collection ratio improved from below 50% in the years 1986-88 to 75%<br />

in 1995, before falling back to 60%.<br />

Groundwater<br />

Annual availability (1998) 38.0km 3<br />

Per capita 4,952m 3<br />

The scope for conflict<br />

The Guinean Government’s 49% per cent share gives it some control over management decisions<br />

and it has the right to approve all changes of a legal nature. There is one potential problem with this<br />

relationship, which is that there is no independent regulator. The balance of stakeholder concerns<br />

may be affected in the future by the government seeking (or seen as seeking) to optimise the return<br />

on its shareholding at the expense of customer concerns. The current challenge for the contract is to<br />

see how the customers’ willingness and their capacity to pay in a period of economic difficulties will be<br />

affected by the ending of all subsidies. It is understood that some tensions exist between SONEG<br />

and SEEG with regard to the operational interpretation of the contract. SONEG sticks to the contract<br />

rigidly, while SEEG is seeking to have a greater degree of operational freedom. This perceived need<br />

for further operational flexibility is to be one of the main elements of the current contract renewal<br />

negotiations. The term of the lease contract is currently expiring and the system is now capable of<br />

attracting a concession contract. For the latter to succeed, affordability needs to be addressed, along<br />

with the relationship between SONEG and SEEG.<br />

In 2001, the lease contract between SEEG and SAUR and Veolia ended, having formally expired in<br />

1999 and no replacement contract being implemented. It is understood that a replacement contract is<br />

still being sought.<br />

MAJOR CITIES<br />

City 2000 2015 Status<br />

Conakry 1,232,000 2,073,000 Formerly privatised (SEEG)<br />

106 <strong>Pinsent</strong> <strong>Masons</strong> <strong>Water</strong> <strong>Yearbook</strong> <strong>2005</strong> – <strong>2006</strong>

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