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SODBatch A&B SPM Comments co-chair response final ... - ipcc-wg3

SODBatch A&B SPM Comments co-chair response final ... - ipcc-wg3

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Chapter-<br />

Comment<br />

<strong>SPM</strong>-<br />

1091<br />

<strong>SPM</strong>-<br />

1092<br />

<strong>SPM</strong>-<br />

1093<br />

para<br />

Batch<br />

From Page<br />

From Line<br />

To Page<br />

To line<br />

<strong>Comments</strong><br />

IPCC WGIII Fourth Assessment Report, Se<strong>co</strong>nd Order Draft<br />

need tight short-term <strong>co</strong>ntrol of emissions is made at line 18, p16 of<br />

Chapter 13, and it's a crucial one to pick up in the <strong>SPM</strong> so that<br />

taxes are not dismissed unfairly. The point about using thresholds<br />

to reduce revenue is in footnote 4 on p10 of Ch 13, but it needs to<br />

be picked up in the <strong>SPM</strong>, because without thresholds,<br />

environmentally effective emission taxes are politically impossible<br />

(hence my "will be" above in place of "may be"), so not worth<br />

<strong>co</strong>nsidering.<br />

(Government of Australia)<br />

27 A 15 12 15 13 "Taxes and charges are e<strong>co</strong>nomically efficient….to implement". It<br />

may be modified to " Taxes and charges are e<strong>co</strong>nomically efficient<br />

where market institutions are in place and operate perfectly but<br />

cannot guarantee a particular level of emissions and may be<br />

politically difficult to implement.<br />

(Government of India)<br />

27 A 15 15 15 17 Suggest adding at the end: "Short-term uncertainty in the permit<br />

price, and hence in the <strong>co</strong>st of emission reductions, is a real <strong>co</strong>st to<br />

emitters that may reduce political acceptability." Comment: this<br />

picks up the last line on Tradable permits in the TS, and since it's a<br />

key (but not the only) reason why industry lobbies against market<br />

instruments of climate policy, it's important to mention in the <strong>SPM</strong>.<br />

(Jack Pezzey, Australian National University)<br />

27 A 15 15 18 0 Tradable permits cannot easily be adjusted piecemeal (you cannot<br />

tighten the cap a little bit every now and then as you can increase<br />

taxes). And permits do not <strong>co</strong>mbine in a simple and addivie manner<br />

with subsidies on the green alternaives. Once you have a permit<br />

scheme that's it: a subsidy will not change emissions but possibly<br />

affect the price. The formulation "the distribution of allowances has<br />

implications for e<strong>co</strong>nomic efficiency and <strong>co</strong>mpetitiveness" is not<br />

ideal. The effects on efficiency (first order) are probably small. It<br />

would be better to say that the distribution of allowances has<br />

implications for political feasibility and in<strong>co</strong>me distribution<br />

effects."<br />

(Thomas Sterner, Univ of Göteborg)<br />

Expert Review of Se<strong>co</strong>nd-Order-Draft<br />

Confidential, Do Not Cite or Quote<br />

Response suggested by <strong>co</strong><strong>chair</strong>s<br />

Action<br />

for<br />

chapter<br />

ACC; add institutional aspects 1061<br />

(13)<br />

See A-1089 1061<br />

(13)<br />

REJ; not <strong>co</strong>nsistent with<br />

literature<br />

Considerations<br />

by the writing<br />

team<br />

Page 292 of 348

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