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Chapter 9 – Structure and Governance in Seaport Clusters; Literature Review 115 cluster, where collective action problems have to be solved. We claim that the ‘institutional position’ of the port authority can be described with the term ‘cluster manager’. For this reason, one could assume that collective action regimes in port clusters are relatively effective compared to other clusters. This issue is not addressed in this study, but deserves further attention. A ‘perfect’ cluster manager would be an organization with the following four characteristics: 1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The ‘perfect’ revenue structure of a cluster manager would be a share of the value added generated in the cluster, for instance through a ‘cluster tax’. 2. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues. Cluster managers are not-for-profit organizations, but do not receive subsidies either. 3. A cluster manager aims to recover investment costs as much as possible from firms that benefit from the investments, through co-finance arrangements with these firms. However, investments cannot be directly recovered because benefits ‘spill-over’ to other firms in the cluster. Therefore, cluster managers need revenues (the cluster tax) that are not directly related to expenditures so that they have resources to invest in the cluster. 4. The ‘investment rule’ of a cluster manager is to invest when ‘cluster benefits’ exceed costs and when (coalitions of) private firms in the cluster do not invest, because a substantial part of the benefits are ‘external’ to the (coalition of) firm(s) 75 . The institutional position of landlord port authorities, especially those with a regional jurisdiction, resembles a perfect cluster manager 76 . The port authority owns the land in the 75 These four characteristics are institutional ones; one could add managerial characteristics to a perfect cluster manager, such as ‘legitimacy in the cluster’. 76 The ‘Hanzeatic port model’ (Kreukels and Wever, 1998) where the local or regional administration controls the port authority, is relatively widespread, especially in continental Europe. In this model the port authority has an additional motive, apart from the
116 The Performance of Seaport Clusters port. Its revenue comes from port dues 77 and lease rents 78 . Landlord ports are (in general) self-sustaining and non-profit organizations. The revenues of port authorities are related to the performance of the cluster as a whole: revenues from port dues and lease contracts go up when the cluster performs well. As a consequence, port authorities have incentives to invest in the performance of the cluster. Furthermore, landlord port authorities only invest when private firms are not willing to invest. Port authorities invest in activities such as port safety and port marketing. Since a variety of firms receive benefits of these investments, no individual firm is willing to make such investments. Thus, port authorities have the position to act as a cluster manager 79 . Following the cluster manager perspective they ‘should’ invest when benefits for the cluster exceed costs for the cluster. Furthermore, they ‘should’ recover costs as specifically as possible, but given the fact that a part of the benefits cannot be priced directly, both land prices and port dues are mechanisms to recover costs in an indirect manner. In Table 33 a distinction between two types of justifications for investments of port authorities is made: justification with reference to the role of port authorities as landlords, and reference to the role of port authorities as cluster managers. abovementioned economic incentives, to invest in the port cluster: it generates employment and value added in the port region. For regional policy makers, such effects are important. 77 Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed ‘port dues’ and in most cases related to the size of vessels. 78 Port authorities lease land to firms such as terminal operators, warehousing and manufacturing firms. In some cases cargo owners also pay a charge to the port authority. These charges are termed wharfage and in general related to the volume and/or the value of goods. The latter does not make sense from an economic point of view and is little used. Volume based wharfage is also not widespread, since cargo owners indirectly pay all transport costs anyway and transaction costs are high. 79 Seaports clusters are special because of the prominent role of port authorities. In many other clusters, such as the Dutch maritime cluster (De Langen, 2002) the shipbuilding cluster in the Northern Netherlands (Van Klink and De Langen, 2001) and Silicon Valley (Hall and Markusen, 1985) a central actor with a similar set of incentives, resources and a similar institutional position is lacking. Therefore, cluster management is likely to be more advanced in seaports than in other clusters.
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PETER W. DE LANGEN The Performance
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The Performance of Seaport Clusters
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Preface v PREFACE My first publicat
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Preface vii The frequent question w
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x Emperical part: three cases of se
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1 INTRODUCTION Economists have alwa
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 3 1.2 Over
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 5 Second,
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2 CLUSTERS AS UNIT OF ANALYSIS In t
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Chapter 2 - Clusters as Unit of Ana
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20 The Performance of Seaport Clust
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22 Table 1: Four ways in which clus
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4 VARIABLES OF CLUSTER PERFORMANCE
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Chapter 4 - Variables of Cluster Pe
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5 CLUSTER STRUCTURE In this chapter
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Chapter 5 - Cluster Structure 41 Th
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Chapter 5 - Cluster Structure 43 ef
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Chapter 5 - Cluster Structure 45 Th
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Chapter 5 - Cluster Structure 47 fi
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Chapter 5 - Cluster Structure 49 va
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Chapter 5 - Cluster Structure 51 Ta
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54 6.1 Coordination in a cluster Th
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Chapter 11 - Governance and Perform
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178 Table 74: Number of experts tha
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180 The Performance of Seaport Clus
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182 The evolution in market shares
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188 Table 85: Concentration pattern
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13 CONCLUSIONS FOR ANALYZING CLUSTE
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Chapter 13 - Conclusions for Analyz
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14 CONCLUSIONS ON SEAPORT CLUSTERS
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Chapter 14 - Conclusions on Seaport
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214 • Waste processing and recycl
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232 Industry experts The Performanc
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234 Agglomeration economies 10. Ind
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236 Cluster barriers Entry barriers
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238 Solving collective action probl
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240 The weight of the variables of
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Appendix 2: Cluster Experts in the
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Appendix 2: Cluster Experts in the
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English Summary 249 The Performance
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English Summary 251 The third schoo
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English Summary 253 The empirical p
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English Summary 255 Internal compet
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English Summary 257 • The innovat
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262 Tabel S1: Het effect van de vie
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Curriculum Vitae 271 Curriculum vit
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The Performance of Seaport Clusters
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