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Chapter 6 – Cluster Governance 61 6.5 Collective action regimes 6.5.1 The problem of collective action The ‘problem’ of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant for all clusters. Even though cooperation to achieve common goals (such as marketing and education) would be beneficial for all organizations involved, such cooperation does not always develop spontaneously. Individual firms can ‘free-ride’ on the cooperative efforts of other firms. Thus, collective action does not arise. The performance of clusters where collective action develops - collective action problems are solved - is better than that of clusters where collective action problems are not solved. In clusters, a number of collective action problems (CAP’s) is present. For each specific CAP a ‘collective action regime’ (CAR) arises (see Mossberger and Stoker, 2001) 41 . In this context, a regime can be defined as a ‘relatively stable collaborative agreement that provides actors with the capacity to overcome collective action problems’ (see Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, for a similar definition). CAR’s are not by definition ‘efficient’ and do not automatically adapt. Inefficient collective action regimes reduce the performance of a cluster, but there is no process of ‘selection and adaptation’ that leads to the survival of effective regimes only. A regime is path dependent and relatively stable over time 42 , because first, energy and capital have been invested in a regime and these investments are ‘sunk costs’ that prevent adaptations of a regime (see Westlund, 1999) and second, a regime defines the ‘rules of the game’ and becomes taken for granted. Consequently, collective action regimes differ substantially between countries, 41 Even though governance regimes differ, a dominant governance style exists at a cluster level (see Campbell et al, 1991). With a ‘bottom-up approach’ similarities of the different regimes in a cluster will become clear, while such an approach allows for taking into account the possibly large differences between different regimes. 42 Campbell et al (1991) argue that ‘When actors have already established associations (…) and thus the capacity for selecting far sighted cooperative strategies, they can more easily devise new multilateral governance mechanisms than actors from a sector where shortsighted bilateral mechanisms dominate the governance regime’ (Campbell et al 1991, p. 331). This illustrates the path-dependence of regimes
62 The Performance of Seaport Clusters industries and clusters (see Hollingsworth et al, 1994). Hollingsworth et al (1994) even argue that differences in regimes are central in the competition between clusters: ‘economic competition is increasingly becoming competition over different systems of production’ (Hollingsworth et al 1994, p. 38). 6.5.2 The roles of modes of governance in collective action regimes Collective action arises when a large number of firms in a cluster cooperate. Consequently the role of markets, individual firms and interfirm alliances in CAR’s is limited (see also Table 8). Associations, public private partnerships and public organizations are governance modes better equipped to solve collective action problems. Associations act in the interests of their members. Associations are ‘vehicles’ for collective action. The ‘domain’ of associations is the provision of collective goods, goods with benefits of which firms cannot be excluded, that are specific for the members of an association 43 . An example of a collective good is interest representation and cluster marketing. Associations can only play a role when their membership base is sufficiently large. If the membership base is low (because many firms ‘free ride’) an association loses legitimacy and costs for (remaining) members go up. Set up costs for associations are high, because members have to invest substantially in time and capital to establish an association. In general, the free-rider problem prevents the spontaneous development of associations, unless groups are small, even though collective action would be in the interest of all actors involved. Since in small groups the collective interest is more closely related to individual interests, associations of small groups are more likely to develop. Olson (1971) distinguishes three kinds of groups: privileged, mediate and latent groups: The small privileged group can expect that its collective needs will probably be met one way or another, and the fairly small (intermediate) group has a fair chance that voluntary action will solve its collective problems, but the large latent 43 Public goods such as safety are in the domain of public bodies (see Streeck and Schnitter [eds.], 1985).
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PETER W. DE LANGEN The Performance
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The Performance of Seaport Clusters
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Preface v PREFACE My first publicat
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Preface vii The frequent question w
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x Emperical part: three cases of se
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1 INTRODUCTION Economists have alwa
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 3 1.2 Over
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 5 Second,
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2 CLUSTERS AS UNIT OF ANALYSIS In t
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112 9.3.3 The presence of intermedi
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118 Figure 15: Optimal investment q
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10 STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN SEA
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Chapter 10 - Structure and Performa
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11 GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE IN SE
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178 Table 74: Number of experts tha
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182 The evolution in market shares
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188 Table 85: Concentration pattern
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13 CONCLUSIONS FOR ANALYZING CLUSTE
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Chapter 13 - Conclusions for Analyz
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14 CONCLUSIONS ON SEAPORT CLUSTERS
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Chapter 14 - Conclusions on Seaport
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214 • Waste processing and recycl
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232 Industry experts The Performanc
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234 Agglomeration economies 10. Ind
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236 Cluster barriers Entry barriers
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238 Solving collective action probl
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240 The weight of the variables of
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Appendix 2: Cluster Experts in the
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Appendix 2: Cluster Experts in the
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English Summary 249 The Performance
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English Summary 251 The third schoo
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English Summary 253 The empirical p
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English Summary 255 Internal compet
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262 Tabel S1: Het effect van de vie
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Curriculum Vitae 271 Curriculum vit
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