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The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...

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Chapter 5 – Cluster Structure 43<br />

effect <strong>of</strong> internal competition ‘Among the strongest empirical findings from our research is<br />

the association between vigorous domestic 20 rivalry and the creation and persistence in an<br />

industry’ (Porter, 1990, p. 117). Porter’s argument is that internal competition leads to<br />

dynamism in the cluster:<br />

<strong>The</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> economic competition is not ‘equilibrium’ but a perpetual state <strong>of</strong><br />

change. Improvement and innovation in an industry are never ending processes<br />

(…). Today’s advantages are soon superseded or nullified. At the core <strong>of</strong><br />

explaining national advantage in an industry must be the role <strong>of</strong> the home nation<br />

in stimulation competitive improvement and innovation (Porter, 1990, p. 70).<br />

Porter bases this conclusion on a variety <strong>of</strong> case studies, but does not provide quantitative<br />

empirical results. He focuses on the effects <strong>of</strong> internal competition on innovation. We<br />

develop three arguments for the positive effects <strong>of</strong> internal competition on cluster<br />

performance, one <strong>of</strong> which is Porter’s ‘vibrant environment argument’.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first argument for the positive effect <strong>of</strong> internal competition is that internal competition<br />

lowers ‘switching costs’ for customers. Internal competition allows firms to shift to an<br />

alternative supplier in the same cluster. In general, these switching costs are lower than<br />

switching costs to a supplier outside the cluster, because <strong>of</strong> higher transaction costs. <strong>The</strong><br />

importance <strong>of</strong> switching costs varies between industries. Relatively high switching costs give<br />

firms in the cluster the opportunity to appropriate ‘economic rents’, by charging higher<br />

prices. This threat by itself reduces the attractiveness <strong>of</strong> a cluster for potential customers.<br />

Second, internal competition fosters specialization (see Baptista, 2000 p. 516). Internal<br />

competition is competition on a perfect level playing field (or to put it differently: cost curves<br />

are similar). Competitors face the same regulation, have the same labor market conditions,<br />

the same trade costs and the same supplier base. In such a competitive environment<br />

specialization <strong>of</strong> products and services is more likely to develop than when competitors<br />

operate in a different environment, because specialization reduces competition and<br />

20 Porter generally speaks about domestic rivalry and the home nation because he does not pay<br />

attention to the issue <strong>of</strong> delimiting the relevant cluster region. This is not problematic for small<br />

countries but it is problematic for large countries. In such countries, competition between firms<br />

in different locations cannot be termed internal competition.

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