The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...
The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...
The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...
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Chapter 6 – Cluster Governance 55<br />
Table 8: Characteristics <strong>of</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> governance<br />
Governance<br />
modes<br />
Firms Smooth<br />
coordination<br />
Market Flexibility and<br />
selection<br />
pressure<br />
Inter-firm<br />
alliances 34<br />
Advantages Disadvantages Domain Capable <strong>of</strong><br />
solving<br />
collective action<br />
problem<br />
Relatively<br />
effective<br />
coordination<br />
Association Pursuing<br />
collective<br />
goals<br />
Public/private<br />
organization<br />
Public<br />
organization<br />
Combination<br />
<strong>of</strong> public and<br />
private<br />
competencies<br />
Capable <strong>of</strong><br />
acting in the<br />
‘public<br />
interest’<br />
Limited set <strong>of</strong><br />
capabilities,<br />
limited flexibility<br />
Coordination<br />
beyond price is<br />
difficult<br />
Reduced<br />
flexibility<br />
Free rider<br />
behavior<br />
Limited<br />
selection<br />
pressure,<br />
limited<br />
accountability<br />
No clear<br />
incentives, no<br />
selection<br />
pressure<br />
Coordination <strong>of</strong><br />
strongly related<br />
economic<br />
activities<br />
Exchange <strong>of</strong><br />
alternatively<br />
available<br />
products<br />
Coordination <strong>of</strong><br />
complementary<br />
activities that<br />
require different<br />
capabilities<br />
Pursuing<br />
collective goals<br />
Projects in the<br />
public interests<br />
that require<br />
private<br />
involvement<br />
Pursuing public<br />
interests<br />
Mechanisms <strong>of</strong><br />
pressure<br />
Not suitable Market<br />
competition<br />
Shareholders/<br />
stakeholders<br />
Not suitable 33 Market<br />
competition<br />
(exit)<br />
Only suitable<br />
for small groups<br />
<strong>of</strong> firms 35 .<br />
Suitable, but<br />
problem <strong>of</strong><br />
incentives<br />
Suitable, but<br />
risk <strong>of</strong><br />
opportunism<br />
Suitable, but<br />
information<br />
problems and<br />
lack <strong>of</strong><br />
incentives<br />
Market<br />
competition<br />
Voice <strong>of</strong><br />
members<br />
Private and<br />
public voice<br />
Public<br />
monitoring<br />
Table 8 also shows whether or not the six governance modes are capable <strong>of</strong> solving a<br />
collective action problem (this issue is discussed in more detail later) and under what<br />
conditions the coordination modes adapt (or are adapted).<br />
33 Contracts to solve a collective action problem are very costly to specify and monitor.<br />
34 <strong>The</strong> term interfirm alliance is used instead <strong>of</strong> the term networks. Interfirm alliances are more<br />
narrowly defined (Nooteboom, 1999A).<br />
35 Interfirm alliances are ‘exclusive partnerships’ with a limited number <strong>of</strong> partners, and thus not<br />
suitable for solving collective action problems for the cluster as a whole.
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