The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...
The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...
The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Seaport</strong> <strong>Clusters</strong><br />
and changes through learning. <strong>The</strong>refore trust does not have to be blind but whether it is<br />
rational or not to trust potential exchange partners depends on the (cluster) environment.<br />
In cluster where the level <strong>of</strong> trust is high, the scope <strong>of</strong> coordination beyond price is larger<br />
than in ‘low-trust clusters’, because uncertainty is reduced and the threat <strong>of</strong> opportunistic<br />
behavior is lower.<br />
<strong>The</strong> level <strong>of</strong> trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance <strong>of</strong> reputation effects in a<br />
cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore it is<br />
worthwhile for firms to build a trustworthy reputation. Because <strong>of</strong> this, the culture <strong>of</strong> trust is<br />
sustainable. This reputation effect has both an economic and a social aspect: firms strive for<br />
a good reputation because it yields positive returns, managers strive for a good reputation<br />
because it yields personal career opportunities.<br />
Thus, in clusters where the reputation effect is strong, the likeliness that one can trust a<br />
potential exchange partner, even when such a partner has an opportunity and an incentive<br />
to damage one’s interests (this is Nooteboom’s (1996) definition <strong>of</strong> intentional trust) is high.<br />
In such ‘high trust clusters’, transaction costs are relatively low.<br />
6.3 Intermediaries<br />
<strong>The</strong> presence or absence <strong>of</strong> intermediaries also influences the quality <strong>of</strong> coordination in the<br />
cluster. Intermediaries reduce coordination costs and expand the ‘scope <strong>of</strong> coordination<br />
beyond price’. Three reasons substantiate the positive effect <strong>of</strong> intermediaries 38 . First, they<br />
provide a ‘bridging tie’ (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) between two or more otherwise not<br />
connected exchange partners. Intermediaries lower search costs for firms looking for<br />
exchange partners, and literally ‘bridge’ gaps between potential exchange partners. Second,<br />
intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they ‘connect cognitions’. Firms operate<br />
in specific markets and develop both capabilities and a cognition matching their market<br />
environment. Intermediaries reduce transaction costs because they can bridge cognitive<br />
differences between firms that operate in very different market environments. This role <strong>of</strong><br />
connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are<br />
characterized by a ‘cognitive division <strong>of</strong> labor’ (Belussi and Gottardi, 2000).