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The Performance of Seaport Clusters - RePub - Erasmus Universiteit ...

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58<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Performance</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Seaport</strong> <strong>Clusters</strong><br />

and changes through learning. <strong>The</strong>refore trust does not have to be blind but whether it is<br />

rational or not to trust potential exchange partners depends on the (cluster) environment.<br />

In cluster where the level <strong>of</strong> trust is high, the scope <strong>of</strong> coordination beyond price is larger<br />

than in ‘low-trust clusters’, because uncertainty is reduced and the threat <strong>of</strong> opportunistic<br />

behavior is lower.<br />

<strong>The</strong> level <strong>of</strong> trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance <strong>of</strong> reputation effects in a<br />

cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore it is<br />

worthwhile for firms to build a trustworthy reputation. Because <strong>of</strong> this, the culture <strong>of</strong> trust is<br />

sustainable. This reputation effect has both an economic and a social aspect: firms strive for<br />

a good reputation because it yields positive returns, managers strive for a good reputation<br />

because it yields personal career opportunities.<br />

Thus, in clusters where the reputation effect is strong, the likeliness that one can trust a<br />

potential exchange partner, even when such a partner has an opportunity and an incentive<br />

to damage one’s interests (this is Nooteboom’s (1996) definition <strong>of</strong> intentional trust) is high.<br />

In such ‘high trust clusters’, transaction costs are relatively low.<br />

6.3 Intermediaries<br />

<strong>The</strong> presence or absence <strong>of</strong> intermediaries also influences the quality <strong>of</strong> coordination in the<br />

cluster. Intermediaries reduce coordination costs and expand the ‘scope <strong>of</strong> coordination<br />

beyond price’. Three reasons substantiate the positive effect <strong>of</strong> intermediaries 38 . First, they<br />

provide a ‘bridging tie’ (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) between two or more otherwise not<br />

connected exchange partners. Intermediaries lower search costs for firms looking for<br />

exchange partners, and literally ‘bridge’ gaps between potential exchange partners. Second,<br />

intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they ‘connect cognitions’. Firms operate<br />

in specific markets and develop both capabilities and a cognition matching their market<br />

environment. Intermediaries reduce transaction costs because they can bridge cognitive<br />

differences between firms that operate in very different market environments. This role <strong>of</strong><br />

connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are<br />

characterized by a ‘cognitive division <strong>of</strong> labor’ (Belussi and Gottardi, 2000).

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