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empirically difficult' phenomenon (Held 1992,131). However, the foundational
texts for the majority of contemporary studies of politeness are generally taken
to be those by Leech (1983); Lakoff (1973; 1979); and Brown and Levinson
(1987)5.
Each of these works share common roots. That is, each owes some
credit to HP Grice's (1975) paper'Logic and Conversation'. In this paper, Grice
posited the general premise that conversation was essentially a rational and co-
operative effort:
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of
disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, co-operative efforts; and
each participant recognises in them, to some extent, a common
purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.
(Grice 1975,45).
Under the heading of what was termed a 'cooperative principle', Grice
set out four conversational maxims, each containing a set of sub-maxims, which
guide conversationalists conducting conversation as a co-operative effort,
namely: quantity - essentially providing an appropriate degree of information for
a conversational contribution to be heard as co-operative; quality - not
knowingly making false claims; relation - being relevant to the ongoing talk; and
manner - avoiding obscurity of expression and ambiguity. Although
conversationalists attempt to adhere to these maxims, as conversation
develops there are in effect varying degrees of conversational latitude and
expressive flexibility in terms of what any speaker may proffer as a relevant and
meaningful conversational contribution. When (as is often the case)
conversationalists appear to be exercising some expressive flexibility and thus
gviolating' one or the other of the above maxims (for example by being
ambiguous or obscure), fellow conversationalists as both mutually co-operative,
rational, and perhaps most importantly, inference drawing actors, infer meaning
from such deviation. In layman's terms, a recipient of such talk might ask"why
is this person not being wholly rational? ", and in effect attempt to 'figure out'
what a person is attempting to convey indirectly. Such communication at the
level of implicature is not only an omni-present possibility in talk, but rather
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