AIB 2012 Conference Proceedings - Academy of International ...
AIB 2012 Conference Proceedings - Academy of International ...
AIB 2012 Conference Proceedings - Academy of International ...
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MONDAY<br />
Session: 2.1.15 - Interactive<br />
Track: 1 - Institutions, Governance, and CSR<br />
Politicians and Political Dynamics in <strong>International</strong> Business<br />
Presented On: July 2, <strong>2012</strong> - 09:00-10:15<br />
Chair: George O. White III, Old Dominion University<br />
Why MNCs Should Invest in Foreign Countries During Political Elections<br />
Charles Harrison, University <strong>of</strong> Pennsylvania<br />
Raed Elaydi, Roosevelt University<br />
As foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNC) has dispersed to desolate regions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
globe, the significance <strong>of</strong> acquiring idiosyncratic host-country information has increased (Javernick-will & Scott,<br />
2010). Embedding within and learning from the host-country institutional landscape has been shown to<br />
promote favorable outcomes related to foreign direct investment (FDI) strategy (Orr & Levitt, 2011, cited in<br />
Scott, Levitt, & Orr, 2011). However, this process is generally viewed as slow and incremental. This discussion<br />
presents a novel and practical, process-based narrative strategy for acquiring information pertaining to hostcountry<br />
investment climates. Pre-entry (prior to formal project proposal) via short-duration immersion and data<br />
gathering in contexts mired with political contestation such as presidential elections is presented as the<br />
alternative. (For more information, please contact: Charles Harrison, University <strong>of</strong> Pennsylvania, USA:<br />
harrison.charles.e@gmail.com)<br />
Contagion and Risk Management Strategy: Navigating Exogenous Shocks in the Global Business Environment<br />
J. Cameron Verhaal, University <strong>of</strong> Utah<br />
Karin Fladmoe-Lindquist, University <strong>of</strong> Utah<br />
We introduce a capabilities-based approach to managing the negative effects <strong>of</strong> contagion and international<br />
crisis. Ultimately, the investment pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> an MNC in both a host country and the region is affected by the<br />
firm's ability to respond to unstable economic, political and social contexts. The mechanisms used to manage<br />
these contexts represent firm-specific capabilities. We identify three: deliberate learning and cognitive search,<br />
firm-specific political resources, and redeployment <strong>of</strong> resources. Moreover, we argue that these capabilities are<br />
moderated by both the nature <strong>of</strong> the investment (i.e. location and asset-specific investments) and crossnational<br />
distance considerations. Ultimately, our conceptual framework <strong>of</strong> contagion management attempts to<br />
unpack the micro and meso-level mechanisms that surround what has been largely understood as a<br />
macroeconomic phenomenon. We also highlight the need to view both an MNC's actions and the multiple<br />
institutional environments that they operate in as highly interdependent. Finally, we argue that the implications<br />
<strong>of</strong> this research can help firms to identify potentially volatile and uncertain investment environments, ex ante,<br />
as well as manage environments that have already been struck by economic, political or social crises associated<br />
with contagion. (For more information, please contact: J. Cameron Verhaal, University <strong>of</strong> Utah, USA:<br />
cameron.verhaal@business.utah.edu)<br />
Political Economy and Financial Architecture<br />
Raj Aggarwal, University <strong>of</strong> Akron<br />
John W. Goodell, University <strong>of</strong> Akron<br />
While it is clear that some countries are bank oriented and others rely more on equity financing, there is little<br />
research on the degree to which national political economies determine the national architecture for financial<br />
intermediation. Using data for a recent fourteen-year period for thirty-six countries, we document that financial<br />
<strong>AIB</strong> <strong>2012</strong> <strong>Conference</strong> <strong>Proceedings</strong><br />
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