AIB 2012 Conference Proceedings - Academy of International ...

MONDAY
determinants for a society's placement along the GII index, and (ii) societal values of ‘Gender Egalitarianism'
and ‘Uncertainty Avoidance' as determinants for a society's placement along the WEO index. An interesting
discovery, and one that warrants further study, is the presence of ‘Uncertainty Avoidance' as a determinant in
both final models. We believe this adds to the debate on which cultural values and traditions may support or
hinder the development of gender equality practices. (For more information, please contact: Andy Bertsch,
Minot State University, USA: andy.bertsch@minotstateu.edu)
Session: 2.4.14 - Interactive
Track: 1 - Institutions, Governance, and CSR
Corporate Governance Issues in International Business
Presented On: July 2, 2012 - 14:30-15:45
Chair: Robert Grosse, George Mason University
Managerial Redeployment, Ownership Structure, and Family Ties
Sharon Belenzon, Duke University
Andrea Patacconi, Aberdeen University
It is widely acknowledged that the ability to redeploy and recombine internal resources is an important source
of competitive advantage. This paper deepens our understanding of the factors affecting internal redeployment
by exploring how shared ownership and managers' family ties influence top managerial mobility in business
groups. We find that managerial redeployment is more common in affiliates that are wholly-owned by the group
controlling shareholder than in affiliates that are only partly-owned. Consistent with property rights view of the
firm, the effect of minority shareholders in a destination affiliate is especially large when the source affiliate is
wholly-owned. A distinctive pattern is observed for managers who are related to one of the group's dominant
shareholders. We discuss the implications of our results for the theory of the firm and the role of family in
business groups. (For more information, please contact: Sharon Belenzon, Duke University, USA:
sb135@duke.edu)
When is a Nexus of Contracts More Firm-Like Theory and Evidence from Business Groups
Sharon Belenzon, Duke University
Andrea Patacconi, Aberdeen University
Bennet A. Zelner, University of Maryland, College Park
When is a nexus of contracts more firm-like We theoretically and empirically address this question in the
context of business groups. We develop a model where assets can be diverted from one group affiliate to
another and asset redeployment is more valuable when firms operate in related industries. The group
ownership structure affects both the controlling shareholder's propensity to expropriate and the minority
shareholders' incentives to monitor. We show that specialized groups choose more vertical structures and may
well exhibit greater ownership concentration than diversified groups. We then confirm these predictions using
novel and comprehensive data on business groups from 15 European countries. Interestingly, however, we also
find substantial cross-country variation. (For more information, please contact: Sharon Belenzon, Duke
University, USA: sb135@duke.edu)
Multiple Paths to the Same Destination: The Role of Private, Public, and Civil Actors in Industry Emergence
Jocelyn M. Leitzinger, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Jennifer Spencer, George Washington University
AIB 2012 Conference Proceedings
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