AIB 2012 Conference Proceedings - Academy of International ...

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architecture is indeed influenced by the nature of the national political-economy. We find that a greater
predilection for market financing over bank financing is associated with less fragmentary, more centralized
polities, with more political checks and balances and less political entrenchment (all associated with strong high
quality polities). We also offer robust evidence that more economically left-leaning and social democratic
governments are more market oriented while parliamentary systems are associated negatively with an
orientation toward markets. We reconfirm that a predilection for markets is associated with greater
concentration of equity market capitalization, more globalization, less regulation, greater cultural emphasis on
hierarchy and lower ambiguity aversion. Our results should be of great interest to scholars and policymakers
interested in the impact of the political economy on financial architecture. (For more information, please
contact: Raj Aggarwal, University of Akron, USA: aggarwa@uakron.edu)
Corporate Political Actions, Nonmarket Positions and the Institutional Environment
Seong-jin Choi, Peking University
Nan Jia, University of Southern California
Jiangyong Lu, Beijing University
This study examines how a firm's nonmarket position – defined as how well the firm is positioned to handle
political risks relative to all peer firms in the same institutional environment – influences the firm's use of
political strategies, and how this relationship is moderated by different institutional contexts. Using survey data
from a random sample of over 16,000 firms in 37 countries over four years, we demonstrate that firms that are
in a less advantageous position to shield themselves from the hazards of state predation and private
expropriation than their peers in the same country are more likely to bribe government officials and engage in
lobbying activities. We also find that the relationship between a firm's relative nonmarket position and its
political strategies is strengthened in a country with lower-quality market-supporting institutions. These findings
have important implications for research on corporate political activities. (For more information, please contact:
Nan Jia, University of Southern California, USA: nan.jia@marshall.usc.edu)
Antecedents and Performance Consequences of Subsidiaries' Political Activities in Emerging Markets: An
Institutional Approach
Stefan Heidenreich, WU Vienna
Jonas F. Puck, WU Vienna
Phillip C. Nell, Copenhagen Business School
This paper analyzes antecedents of political activities deployed by MNC subsidiaries in emerging markets and
subsequently examines their effect on subsidiary performance. Following institutional theory reasoning, we
point towards institutional duality subsidiaries are confronted with, entailing isomorphic pressures stemming
from their internal as well as their external environment. Our hypotheses are tested using a three-stage least
squares method with data from 156 subsidiaries in emerging markets. Results contribute to theory by providing
evidence on the effects stemming from internal vs. external isomorphic pressures on political activities, and
delivering a deeper-level understanding of the latter relationship by differentiating the higher-level concept of
external isomorphic pressures into pressures from national public and national private stakeholders. Finally, we
find significant support for a positive effect of political activities on subsidiary performance, revealing strong
implications for practitioners. (For more information, please contact: Stefan Heidenreich, WU Vienna, Austria:
stefan.heidenreich@wu.ac.at)
Determinants of Voluntary Environmental Management Practices for MNE Subsidiaries in an Emerging Country
Erkan Bayraktar, Bahcesehir University
Ekrem Tatoglu, Bahcesehir University
Sunil Sahadev, University of Sheffield
Mehmet Demirbag, University of Sheffield
AIB 2012 Conference Proceedings
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