The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce

why not one virtue? 367Murdoch, though no Aristotelian, agreed that the virtues short of theGood are indeed separable and rankable. They form an interlocked system,not to be reduced to one, and certainly not to something like “Utility.” “Thegood man,” she wrote, “knows whether and when art or politics is moreimportant than family. The good man sees the way in which the virtues arerelated to each other.” 12Related, not absorbed. For example, a good life is not to be understoodas pleasure, or else we have simply absorbed all virtues into prudence.J. Budziszewski, though he admires Adam Smith’s book The Theory of MoralSentiments, argues that “for Smith, the criterion of human flourishing is apleasurable activity of the soul rather than a rational activity of the soil: hisdoctrine of virtue rests on a hedonic foundation.” 13 I am not so sure. I admitthat one can give a hedonic reading to such remarks as “What so great happinessas to be beloved, and to know that we deserve to be loved?” But notethe “that we deserve to be,” “because it excites these sentiments in othermen.” Smith disagrees with the Hume of A Treatise on Human Nature,single-mindedly emphasizing a self-interest utility and the control of passions;he agrees with the later Hume of the Inquiry Concerning the Principlesof Morals, admitting sheer love, called “sympathy.” Such love, approbation,sympathy is a matter of solidarity with others, not utility. 14And the good that Smith seeks is not merely other-directed. The ImpartialSpectator inside the Smithian soul embodies the rational activity of asoul. Smith divides your soul theatrically into an actor and a spectator, andassigns you responsibility for both within you. You are not merely autilitarian enjoyer. You are the backstage producer as much as the customerat the ticket window. “To be amiable and to be meritorious: that is, todeserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of virtue” is nota sentence that a Bentham could have written. 15 “Deserving” an ice creamcone this afternoon may increase your utilitarian pleasure. But the deservingpart is itself a separate ethical construction. It’s not made from pleasuring.Not in Smith.But anyway Budziszewski is correct that reducing virtue to pleasure can’tbe allowed. After all, a highly specialized hero or saint could be having a jollygood time, achieving pleasure in the exclusive exercise of his or her singlemindedvirtue. Heroism or sainthood, however, or for that matter the maximizingutility of the wholly prudent man, is not in any of its extreme formsa full human life, rationally speaking.