Aspect in Ancient Greek - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Aspect in Ancient Greek - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Aspect in Ancient Greek - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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24 Chapter 3. <strong>Aspect</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal semantics3.2 The perfective-imperfective dist<strong>in</strong>ction3.2.1 Kamp et al.: events and statesThe passé simple and imparfait are generally considered to be the Frenchrealisations of the perfective-imperfective dist<strong>in</strong>ction (cf. Vet 1994, but seede Swart 1998 (to be discussed <strong>in</strong> section 3.2.3) <strong>for</strong> a different view). Anattempt to capture the difference <strong>in</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g between the two verb <strong>for</strong>ms wasone of the motivations <strong>for</strong> Kamp to develop a new discourse-based framework:Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). S<strong>in</strong>ce I will <strong>for</strong>mulate my analysis<strong>in</strong> this framework, I first devote a section to its basic ideas. Then I discussthe treatment of aspect of Kamp et al. <strong>in</strong> terms of this framework. For amore extensive <strong>in</strong>troduction to DRT the reader is referred to Kamp and Reyle(1993) and Geurts and Beaver (2007).3.2.1.1 Discourse Representation TheoryAs implied by its name, Discourse Representation Theory focuses on the <strong>in</strong>terpretationof discourse rather than sentences <strong>in</strong> isolation. Its basic idea isthat natural language utterances are <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> a cont<strong>in</strong>ually evolv<strong>in</strong>g discourse.In the course of this <strong>in</strong>terpretation process the hearer constructs arepresentation of the discourse encountered thus far. As the discourse unfolds,he <strong>in</strong>corporates the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation conveyed by each subsequent sentence <strong>in</strong> thealready established representation. This <strong>in</strong>cremental <strong>in</strong>terpretation proceduredoes justice to the fact that the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of a sentence often depends on<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation given <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g discourse. This type of context dependenceis clearly visible <strong>in</strong> sentences with anaphoric expressions, i.e. expressions that<strong>in</strong> some sense <strong>in</strong>herit their value from earlier expressions, their antecedents.Pronouns are clear cases of such expressions. Consider the follow<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>idiscourse:(25) John owns a dog. He likes it.To <strong>in</strong>terpret the second sentence, we need the context provided by the first.Otherwise, what would he refer to, or it? As it turns out, many expressions <strong>in</strong>natural language exhibit this type of context dependence and classical logic isnot very well suited to deal with them. As (26) illustrates, <strong>in</strong> predicate logic wecan easily represent the truth conditions of the first sentence, and of the whole