09.02.2013 Views

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

(c) <strong>Enron</strong>'s financial condition, including its liquidity and credit standing, was not<br />

nearly as strong as represented, as <strong>Enron</strong> was concealing billions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>of</strong> debt that should have<br />

been reported on its balance sheet – and which would have very negatively affected its credit rating,<br />

financial condition and liquidity – by improperly transferring that debt to the balance sheets <strong>of</strong><br />

various non-qualifying SPEs and partnerships it controlled, as detailed herein.<br />

(d) <strong>Enron</strong> generated hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its and transferred<br />

billions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>of</strong>f its balance sheet by entering into non-arm's-length transactions with<br />

SPEs and partnerships <strong>Enron</strong> controlled, including Chewco/JEDI, for which <strong>Enron</strong> had guaranteed<br />

loans to the SPEs and Barclays had provided a phony equity portion, to avoid improper<br />

consolidation.<br />

(e) <strong>The</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>'s WEOS business – its largest business unit – were<br />

manipulated and falsified to boost its reported pr<strong>of</strong>itability in various ways. First, by phony or<br />

illusory hedging transactions with entities that were not independent <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>. Second, by the abuse<br />

<strong>of</strong> mark-to-market accounting by adopting unreasonable contract valuations and economic<br />

assumptions when contracts were initially entered into. And third, by arbitrarily adjusting those<br />

values upward at quarter's end to boost the wholesale operation's pr<strong>of</strong>its for that period – a practice<br />

known inside <strong>Enron</strong> as "moving the curve." For instance, prospective international deals were<br />

prepared by internal <strong>Enron</strong> "developers," who created the deal structure. <strong>The</strong> developers then<br />

presented the materials to <strong>Enron</strong>'s Risk Analysis & Control ("RAC") department with an estimated<br />

net present value ("NPV"), calculated over 20 years, and <strong>Enron</strong>'s return on investment ("ROI") over<br />

the life <strong>of</strong> the deal. <strong>The</strong> calculation <strong>of</strong> NPV and ROI required the use <strong>of</strong> numerous assumptions –<br />

such as foreign-exchange rates, revenue growth, inflation rates, cost escalation, economic growth<br />

and demand. <strong>Enron</strong> manipulated the assumptions to inflate projected revenues and deflate projected<br />

- 153 -

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!