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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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price triggers which created obligations on <strong>Enron</strong>'s part once its price dropped to a certain level.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se transactions were a significant part <strong>of</strong> the reason <strong>Enron</strong> failed. Osprey was an investor in<br />

Whitewing with which <strong>Enron</strong> did numerous sales transactions to generate income. Whitewing itself<br />

had 75 subsidiaries which were used by <strong>Enron</strong> to generate income and conceal debt.<br />

498. <strong>The</strong>se transactions, which occurred throughout 00, permitted <strong>Enron</strong> to not only report<br />

sales revenue but also to conceal debt. <strong>Enron</strong>, with the participation <strong>of</strong> CitiGroup, CS First Boston<br />

and Deutsche Bank arranged the partnerships which made <strong>Enron</strong> appear more pr<strong>of</strong>itable than it was.<br />

<strong>Enron</strong> promised to issue stock if the partnerships assets <strong>of</strong> Osprey and Marlin turned out to be worth<br />

less than promised. <strong>The</strong>se guarantees were a huge liability, which <strong>Enron</strong> did not report on its balance<br />

sheet. <strong>The</strong>se guarantees also involved triggers which would require additional shares to be used if<br />

<strong>Enron</strong>'s stock dropped below a certain point. <strong>The</strong> put or trigger insured the SPE underwriters and<br />

securities holders that if <strong>Enron</strong> stock declined to the trigger price the credit <strong>of</strong> the SPE would be<br />

restored by a new infusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> stock (or equivalent cash). If <strong>Enron</strong> did not shore up the amount<br />

<strong>of</strong> its stock in the SPE to cover the decline in value <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> stock, the SPE would be liquidated and<br />

the contents would return to the <strong>Enron</strong> balance sheet. <strong>The</strong> trigger prices read like a scaled or tiered<br />

device whereby CS First Boston and the other banks which participated in the SPEs would have their<br />

risks hedged as <strong>Enron</strong>'s stock price declined.<br />

499. <strong>The</strong> assets and investments which were transferred to Whitewing were the product<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>’s day-to-day businesses, including energy, natural gas, electricity, oil, coal, paper and pulp,<br />

interests in power plants, interest in pulp and paper plants, interests in gas pipelines, electricity<br />

transmission and distribution lines, and unlit (dark) fiber-optic cable and conduit.<br />

500. According to former <strong>Enron</strong> employees, it was well known within <strong>Enron</strong> that many<br />

<strong>of</strong> these assets decreased in value by the second half <strong>of</strong> 00. Furthermore, top management, including<br />

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