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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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LJM2 would do had tripled their investment in just two years and that overall returns <strong>of</strong> 2,500%<br />

to LJM2 investors were actually anticipated. In short, the non-public <strong>of</strong>fering memorandum was<br />

an invitation to join in the benefits <strong>of</strong> self-dealing transactions with <strong>Enron</strong>. <strong>Enron</strong>'s bankers and the<br />

top executives <strong>of</strong> those banks were permitted to invest in LJM2, as a reward to them for their<br />

ongoing participation in the scheme – a sure thing for them.<br />

26. It was indispensable to defendants' scheme that LJM2 be formed before year-end 99<br />

because <strong>of</strong> the need to use it as a vehicle to consummate some transactions with <strong>Enron</strong> before year-<br />

end 99 to create huge pr<strong>of</strong>its for <strong>Enron</strong> in the 4thQ 99 so that <strong>Enron</strong> could meet and exceed its<br />

forecasted 99 earnings. However, as had been the case with Chewco at year-end 97, there was<br />

tremendous time pressure and Merrill Lynch could not raise the money from outside investors in<br />

LJM2 in time to fund LJM2 by year-end 99 with sufficient capital to enable it to do the desperately<br />

needed transactions with <strong>Enron</strong>. So, in an extraordinary step, in 12/99, <strong>Enron</strong>, Fastow, Kopper,<br />

Andersen, Vinson & Elkins and <strong>Enron</strong>'s banks and bankers (JP Morgan, CIBC, Deutsche Bank, CS<br />

First Boston, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch), knowing that LJM2 was going to be an<br />

extraordinarily lucrative investment anyway, created documentation that enabled the banks to<br />

advance virtually 100% <strong>of</strong> the monies needed to initially fund LJM2, i.e., many times more than their<br />

allocated shares in 12/99. <strong>The</strong>n, after LJM2 was fully funded in 00 and other investors' money<br />

flowed into LJM2, those banks' initial "over-funding" in 12/99 was adjusted for in subsequent capital<br />

contributions to LJM2.<br />

27. To ensure that LJM2 could be an effective instrumentality <strong>of</strong> defendants' scheme to<br />

manipulate <strong>Enron</strong>'s reported pr<strong>of</strong>its and financial condition and enable <strong>Enron</strong> to conceal the true<br />

extent <strong>of</strong> its debt, LJM2 needed bank financing. So JP Morgan initially provided a $65 million line<br />

<strong>of</strong> credit to LJM2 – later, increased to $120 million with CS First Boston doing the lending – to<br />

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