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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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<strong>Enron</strong> Defendants had permitted <strong>Enron</strong>'s business model to evolve to where the actual ongoing<br />

success <strong>of</strong> the finances <strong>of</strong> the business depended upon keeping <strong>Enron</strong>'s stock price trading above<br />

several equity issuance trigger levels which placed further pressures on them to do whatever was<br />

necessary to keep <strong>Enron</strong>'s stock trading at high levels.<br />

397. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> Defendants who were on <strong>Enron</strong>'s Management Committee were the top<br />

executives <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y had daily contact with each other while running <strong>Enron</strong> as "hands-on"<br />

managers, dealing with the important issues facing <strong>Enron</strong>'s business, i.e., WEOS, EES, EBS, its<br />

JEDI and LJM partnerships and the related SPEs and <strong>Enron</strong>'s future revenues and pr<strong>of</strong>its. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Enron</strong><br />

Defendants controlled and/or possessed the power and authority to control the contents <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>'s<br />

Registration Statements, its Form 10-K SEC filings and its quarterly and annual reports and press<br />

releases, and were provided with copies <strong>of</strong> the filings, reports and releases alleged herein to be<br />

misleading prior to or shortly after their issuance and had the ability and opportunity to prevent their<br />

issuance or cause them to be corrected.<br />

398. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> directors who were on <strong>Enron</strong>'s Executive, Finance and Audit Committees<br />

were much more involved in <strong>Enron</strong>'s day-to-day operations than is normally the case with "outside<br />

directors." <strong>The</strong>se directors were also in frequent contact with Lay, Skilling, Fastow, Buy and Causey<br />

to receive information from them about <strong>Enron</strong>'s business and they received copies <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>'s internal<br />

operating and budget reports circulated to <strong>Enron</strong>'s top executives. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> securities <strong>of</strong>ferings<br />

during the Class Period could not have taken place without the authorization <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>'s Board.<br />

399. Because <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Enron</strong> Defendants' positions with the Company, they each had access<br />

to the adverse non-public information about its business, partnerships and investments, finances,<br />

products, markets and present and future business prospects via access to internal corporate<br />

documents (including the Company's operating plans, budgets and forecasts and reports <strong>of</strong> actual<br />

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