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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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<strong>Enron</strong>'s closeness to LJM2 was reinforced not just by Fastow's role, but by<br />

an appearance by <strong>Enron</strong> then-<strong>President</strong> Jeffrey Skilling at an LJM2 partnership<br />

meeting in the fall <strong>of</strong> 2000.<br />

In a Feb. 6, 2001, letter to investors, Fastow recounted a successful year with<br />

"deal flow higher than originally expected" and the projected returns "far in excess<br />

<strong>of</strong> the targeted 30%."<br />

<strong>The</strong> partnership still had nearly $400 million in assets in early January ....<br />

31. Not only did these favored investors in LJM2 get a promise <strong>of</strong> superior returns when<br />

LJM2 was formed, they actually witnessed a series <strong>of</strong> extraordinary pay outs from the Raptor SPEs<br />

which LJM2 controlled over the next two years – securing hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars in<br />

distributions from the Raptors to LJM2 and then to themselves – cash generated by the illicit and<br />

improper transactions <strong>Enron</strong> was engaging in – i.e., the manipulative devices – with the Raptors to<br />

falsify <strong>Enron</strong>'s financial results. Thus, the banks and bankers who were partners in LJM2 were not<br />

only knowing participants in the <strong>Enron</strong> scheme to defraud, they were economic beneficiaries <strong>of</strong><br />

it. Had the <strong>Enron</strong> Ponzi scheme continued to operate for the full life <strong>of</strong> the LJM2 partnership,<br />

<strong>Enron</strong>'s banks would have achieved the stupendous returns they were promised – measured in<br />

thousands <strong>of</strong> percent. And these actual and potential payments from LJM2 were on top <strong>of</strong> the<br />

huge advisory fees, underwriter fees, interest and loan commitment fees these banks were already<br />

getting from <strong>Enron</strong> and would continue to get if the <strong>Enron</strong> scheme continued.<br />

32. From 6/99 through 6/01, <strong>Enron</strong> entered into numerous transactions with the LJM<br />

partnerships. <strong>Enron</strong> sold assets to LJM that it wanted to get <strong>of</strong>f its books on terms that no<br />

independent third party would ever have agreed to. <strong>The</strong> transactions between the LJM partnerships<br />

and <strong>Enron</strong> or its affiliates occurred close to the end <strong>of</strong> financial reporting periods to artificially<br />

boost reported results to meet forecasts <strong>Enron</strong> and other participants in the scheme had been<br />

making. For instance, near the end <strong>of</strong> the 3rd and 4thQ 99, <strong>Enron</strong> sold interests in seven assets to<br />

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