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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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<strong>of</strong> things – the LJM transactions were reviewed by internal and external auditors<br />

and lawyers, approved by <strong>Enron</strong>'s Board <strong>of</strong> Directors.<br />

• Lay and <strong>Enron</strong>'s Board <strong>of</strong> Directors continued to have the highest faith and<br />

confidence in Fastow and believed he was doing an outstanding job as CFO.<br />

• <strong>Enron</strong> remained well positioned for continued success.<br />

• <strong>The</strong> transactions that were done with the partnerships could have been and would<br />

have been done with other parties and there would have been no change in the<br />

earnings recognized from the transactions.<br />

• <strong>Enron</strong> was not trying to conceal anything. <strong>Enron</strong> was not hiding anything.<br />

• <strong>The</strong>re was a Chinese wall between LJM and <strong>Enron</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Board put in place and<br />

the Company adhered to some very strict procedures which would ensure that<br />

anytime anybody inside <strong>Enron</strong> was dealing with LJM, there would be a process<br />

whereby <strong>Enron</strong> and its shareholders' interest would be paramount. And again,<br />

keep it in mind that they did not have to put any projects or investments in LJM or<br />

any <strong>of</strong> the other vehicles related to LJM so it was strictly discretionary and<br />

obviously it had to be in <strong>Enron</strong>'s best interest before those investments or projects<br />

were put in there.<br />

378. On 10/23/01, CS First Boston issued a report on <strong>Enron</strong>. <strong>The</strong> report continued to rate<br />

<strong>Enron</strong> a "Strong Buy" and continued to forecast 01 and 02 EPS <strong>of</strong> $1.80 and $2.15 for <strong>Enron</strong>. It also<br />

stated:<br />

ENE held a conference call this morning with information to address the recent<br />

decline in its share price and the financial and financing implications <strong>of</strong> the SEC<br />

request for information regarding "related party transactions."<br />

With committed bank credit lines <strong>of</strong> $3.35 billion un-drawn, $1.85 billion <strong>of</strong> which<br />

support already issued commercial paper, ENE has $1.5 billion available for new<br />

commercial paper issuance.<br />

* * *<br />

ENEs debt ratings are generally three steps above "junk" status.... [W]e regard ENEs<br />

credit ratings and balance sheet issues as unlikely to worsen materially.<br />

379. On 10/23/01, Lehman Brothers issued a report on <strong>Enron</strong>. <strong>The</strong> report continued to rate<br />

<strong>Enron</strong> a "Strong Buy" and continued to forecast 01 and 02 EPS <strong>of</strong> $1.82 and $2.18, as well as a 20%<br />

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