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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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it controlled, and was doing phony deals with, with shares <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> common stock and <strong>Enron</strong> had<br />

agreed to issue millions <strong>of</strong> shares <strong>of</strong> its stock to these entities if <strong>Enron</strong>'s stock price declined below<br />

certain so-called "trigger prices." Because <strong>of</strong> the triggers and the way <strong>Enron</strong> capitalized the SPEs,<br />

it was absolutely vital that <strong>Enron</strong>'s stock continue to trade at high levels and that <strong>Enron</strong> maintain its<br />

"investment grade" credit rating, otherwise defendants' scheme would unravel.<br />

19. <strong>Enron</strong>'s investment grade credit rating was indispensable to enabling it to get<br />

counterparties to do huge trading transactions with it – transactions others would not do unless<br />

assured <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>'s creditworthiness. Since <strong>Enron</strong>'s trading <strong>of</strong> energy resources was the core <strong>of</strong> its<br />

WEOS business, any downgrade <strong>of</strong> its credit rating would have disastrous consequences for its core<br />

business operation. This investment grade credit rating gave <strong>Enron</strong> access to the commercial paper<br />

market – a market reserved for America's largest and most creditworthy corporations – so that it<br />

could borrow billions <strong>of</strong> dollars to maintain its liquidity and finance its capital-intensive business.<br />

<strong>Enron</strong>'s access to the commercial paper market also meant that <strong>Enron</strong>'s $3 billion commercial paper<br />

back-up credit line, arranged by the lead banks (JP Morgan and CitiGroup) with participating banks,<br />

would not be drawn down upon, thus limiting those banks' financial exposure to <strong>Enron</strong>. It also<br />

meant that <strong>Enron</strong> and its banks could easily sell debt securities to public investors to raise long-term<br />

capital, using the proceeds to reduce its short-term commercial paper and other bank debt. Finally,<br />

<strong>Enron</strong>'s investment grade credit rating was critical to the scheme, as only <strong>Enron</strong>'s insiders and its<br />

banks knew, because under the terms <strong>of</strong> the partnerships/SPE deals, if <strong>Enron</strong>'s debt was<br />

downgraded to below investment grade, the debt <strong>of</strong> those entities that they had told the securities<br />

markets was non-recourse as to <strong>Enron</strong> would become recourse to <strong>Enron</strong>, which could cause the<br />

house <strong>of</strong> cards to topple. As <strong>Enron</strong>'s CFO stated in a 10/01 conference call, "We understand that<br />

our credit rating is critical to both the capital markets as well as our counterparties." Earlier,<br />

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