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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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evenue. Even though <strong>Enron</strong> could not determine what the LPG price would be so many years out,<br />

<strong>Enron</strong> moved the curve up $20 million on the deal because <strong>Enron</strong> needed to get its revenue numbers<br />

up for the end <strong>of</strong> 00. When one trader refused to move the curve up because there was no valid<br />

justification to do so, the trader was told to mind his own business and the curve was moved up by<br />

a superior. <strong>The</strong> trader left <strong>Enron</strong> because <strong>of</strong> this manipulation. This was not an isolated incident as,<br />

in fact, curve manipulations occurred in every quarter in all <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>'s WEOS operation.<br />

(f) <strong>The</strong> financial performance and the value <strong>of</strong> contracts entered into by EES were<br />

grossly overstated through various techniques, including the misuse and abuse <strong>of</strong> mark-to-market<br />

accounting to create huge current-period values for <strong>Enron</strong> on what were, in fact, highly speculative<br />

and indeterminate outcomes <strong>of</strong> long-term contracts. This resulted in EES improperly and<br />

prematurely recognizing hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>of</strong> revenue that not only boosted its financial<br />

results, but allowed top EES managers and executives to collect huge bonuses based on these<br />

improperly inflated contract valuations.<br />

(g) EES was, in fact, losing hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars on many <strong>of</strong> its retail<br />

energy contracts. To induce customers to enter into these agreements – so that <strong>Enron</strong> could claim<br />

its EES business was growing and succeeding – <strong>Enron</strong> had, in effect, "purchased" their participation<br />

by promising them unrealistic savings, charging low prices <strong>Enron</strong> knew would likely result in a loss,<br />

and spending millions <strong>of</strong> dollars in the short term to purchase purportedly more energy-efficient<br />

equipment, a significant portion <strong>of</strong> which costs <strong>Enron</strong> knew it was likely never to recover and<br />

certainly never to make a pr<strong>of</strong>it on. <strong>Enron</strong> executives knew that <strong>Enron</strong> would lose money on the<br />

EES deals, but had to make them more and more attractive to generate new clients, while the<br />

Company utilized unrealistic projections and mark-to-market accounting to mislead investors into<br />

believing that the EES contracts were making money. For instance:<br />

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