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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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439. However, even after employing the bogus transfer to Dodson, the <strong>Enron</strong> Defendants<br />

could not get the 3% equity needed to avoid consolidation because Kopper indirectly invested<br />

approximately $125,000 in Chewco before transferring his interest to Dodson. However, no third-<br />

party investors were willing to provide outside equity. To obtain the remaining $11.4 million needed<br />

to reach 3%, Barclays agreed to provide what were described as "equity loans" to entities investing<br />

in Chewco. Barclays and the <strong>Enron</strong> Defendants prepared the documentation to allow Barclays to<br />

characterize the advances as loans (for business and regulatory reasons), while allowing <strong>Enron</strong> and<br />

Chewco simultaneously to mischaracterize them as equity contributions in order to approach the 3%<br />

equity investment. <strong>The</strong> Barclays loans were reflected in documents that resembled promissory notes<br />

and loan agreements, but were labeled "certificates" and "funding agreements." <strong>The</strong> Barclays<br />

documents required the borrowers to pay "yield" at a specified percentage rate, i.e., interest.<br />

Barclays, however, threw a wrench into the scheme by requiring the borrowers to establish cash<br />

"reserve accounts" <strong>of</strong> $6.6 million in cash that would secure repayment <strong>of</strong> the $11.4 million. <strong>The</strong><br />

reserve account was funded when JEDI wired $6.58 million to Barclays on 12/30/97. <strong>The</strong> agreement<br />

was prepared by Vinson & Elkins. This transfer cut Chewco's purported 3% at risk, independent<br />

"equity" in half.<br />

440. Thus, even the illusory "equity" <strong>of</strong> 3% was not achieved since Barclays received the<br />

reserve <strong>of</strong> $6.6 million to secure what was clearly a loan and therefore did not qualify as outside<br />

equity "at risk." Consequently, even under <strong>Enron</strong>'s contorted interpretation <strong>of</strong> qualifying SPEs,<br />

Chewco did not have the required equity at risk and did not qualify as an adequately capitalized SPE.<br />

As a result, under EITF No. 90-15 and Topic D-14, Chewco was required to be, but improperly was<br />

not, consolidated into <strong>Enron</strong>'s consolidated financial statements from the outset. Further, because<br />

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