09.02.2013 Views

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

(i) <strong>Enron</strong> entered into dark-fiber swaps to book a pr<strong>of</strong>it on the gain from<br />

the sale. <strong>The</strong> EBS dark-fiber deals used an overvalued price for the swaps. Even though <strong>Enron</strong><br />

agreed to pay a higher price – above true value – for the fiber it was getting, <strong>Enron</strong> also paid an<br />

equivalent higher price for what it was selling. One deal that <strong>Enron</strong> did with LJM illuminates this.<br />

Top executives asserted pressure on EBS personnel to make needed revenue numbers for the 3rdQ<br />

00, which resulted in booking a dark-fiber deal with LJM worth over $300 million. <strong>The</strong> sole reason<br />

for this deal was to enable <strong>Enron</strong> to make the required quarterly revenue number;<br />

(ii) <strong>Enron</strong> boasted about its high and increasing volume <strong>of</strong> broadband<br />

trades, but these purported trades were not pr<strong>of</strong>itable. In essence, <strong>Enron</strong> and its trading partners<br />

exchanged fiber-optic capacity with one another in transactions that were nearly similar in the buying<br />

and selling prices. So while cash was exchanged in these transactions, they did not result in actual<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>its for <strong>Enron</strong> or its trading partners because the Company's cash outlay for purchasing access to<br />

the other party's fiber-optic lines was nearly the same as the money paid for access to <strong>Enron</strong>'s<br />

network;<br />

(iii) <strong>The</strong> situation in EBS was so desperate by Spring 01 that there was a<br />

coup attempt by several managers who reported to CEO Rice and COO Hannon and wanted them<br />

moved out <strong>of</strong> EBS. <strong>The</strong> managing directors met with Skilling and informed him that EBS was in<br />

extremely dire straits – there was "no way to win," EBS "had no income," and the "cash-burn rate<br />

was too high." <strong>The</strong>y showed Skilling actual EBS performance numbers. Rejecting their request,<br />

Skilling neither replaced Rice and Hannon nor did he make any changes, other than having the<br />

managing director also now report to him directly to keep him updated on the disaster in EBS; and<br />

(iv) Despite concrete evidence <strong>of</strong> EBS's failed operations, EBS CEO Rice<br />

publicly stated that broadband's assets had an estimated value <strong>of</strong> $36 billion. A high-ranking former<br />

- 274 -

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!