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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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creditworthiness. In addition, <strong>Enron</strong> knew from discussions with government <strong>of</strong>ficials in India that<br />

they would oppose paying <strong>Enron</strong> for power from Dabhol at anywhere near the rates <strong>Enron</strong> intended<br />

to charge and, in fact, was charging after the plant began commercial operations. Dabhol would not<br />

be a strong contributor to earnings and pr<strong>of</strong>it.<br />

(i) Other <strong>Enron</strong> international operations were financial disasters and were not<br />

"high return projects" that "would lead to major earnings gains for years." For instance, <strong>Enron</strong>'s<br />

Dominican Republic power plant project was a disaster before ground was broken. <strong>Enron</strong> paid to<br />

build a power plant in a country where existing plants were not being paid for. <strong>Enron</strong> went ahead,<br />

because internal developers got the majority <strong>of</strong> their bonuses before construction ever began.<br />

Likewise, at Batangas in the Philippines, developers promised – and were paid for – a water-cooled<br />

power plant on flat ground, but engineers faced the all but impossible task <strong>of</strong> building the plant on<br />

the side <strong>of</strong> a hill, using one road, and no access to water. <strong>Enron</strong> overpaid for each <strong>of</strong> its Central<br />

American projects, all <strong>of</strong> which proved to be operational nightmares, unpr<strong>of</strong>itable and virtually<br />

impossible to unload, but <strong>Enron</strong>'s internal developers always received their bonuses because they<br />

were not awarded based on actual project earnings or results or even the ability to turn the key and<br />

start the project, but on flawed and false projections <strong>of</strong> future pr<strong>of</strong>its.<br />

(j) <strong>Enron</strong> was further falsifying its financial condition, especially its international<br />

operations, through a technique known inside the Company as "snowballing." That is, <strong>Enron</strong> took<br />

the escalating costs <strong>of</strong> bidding on large projects that it lost and, instead <strong>of</strong> expensing those costs in<br />

the current period as required, rolled those costs over into some other unrelated international project<br />

that <strong>Enron</strong> was bidding on or actually performing – in either event, avoiding recognizing those costs<br />

in the current period.<br />

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