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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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streaming content because the EIN and BOS didn't work – and multiplied that number by the number<br />

<strong>of</strong> customers each ISP had. Thus, the 16 million customers <strong>Enron</strong> claimed as its own, in fact,<br />

belonged to ISPs. Moreover, assuming that <strong>Enron</strong> could provide the high-quality uninterrupted<br />

bandwidth-on-demand that it claimed the EIN could provide through the BOS – neither <strong>of</strong> which<br />

ever worked – as <strong>of</strong> 12/00 an internal EBS document reflects that EBS only had enough server<br />

capacity to reach about 47,000 customers, which is about 15 million customers short <strong>of</strong> the total<br />

<strong>Enron</strong> claimed 12 months earlier! In short, <strong>Enron</strong> had no real broadband customers or revenues,<br />

and the EIN was nowhere near being substantially complete.<br />

(l) <strong>The</strong> prospects for future revenue and pr<strong>of</strong>its from <strong>Enron</strong>'s EBS operation and<br />

the purported value <strong>of</strong> that operation to <strong>Enron</strong> and to its stock price was completely arbitrary and<br />

without any basis in fact because <strong>Enron</strong> knew from current problems in that business, as well as the<br />

current state <strong>of</strong> EBS business, that such revenue and pr<strong>of</strong>it forecasts and valuations were arbitrary,<br />

unreasonable and unobtainable.<br />

(m) <strong>Enron</strong>'s purported growth in broadband intermediation – trading bandwidth<br />

access – was neither as successful as claimed nor was the market developing as quickly or in the<br />

manner <strong>Enron</strong> asserted. <strong>Enron</strong> grossly overstated the number <strong>of</strong> customers or counterparties it was<br />

doing bandwidth intermediation with by counting as ongoing customers or trading partners entities<br />

that had done only a test or an experimental trade and not engaging in any ongoing bandwidth<br />

intermediation. Even worse, <strong>Enron</strong> grossly overstated the number <strong>of</strong> trades being conducted by its<br />

broadband intermediation to create the illusion <strong>of</strong> ever-increasing levels <strong>of</strong> activity, which it<br />

accomplished by splitting up what was, in fact, a single unified trade into five or 10 or even more<br />

separate trades, thus creating the false image <strong>of</strong> increasing trading activity. For instance, Broadband<br />

traders would turn one EBS transaction into multiple trades, just to show the volume <strong>of</strong> broadband<br />

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