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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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for a risk-adverse executive, or (2) outside the range <strong>of</strong> rational option exercises. Where the option<br />

exercises appear to be irrational, these option exercises may be rationally explained when inside<br />

information is taken into account. For example, prematurely exercising an option with a strike price<br />

close to the market price <strong>of</strong> a stock would be irrational unless the executive had inside information<br />

which led him or her to believe the company would soon be in bankruptcy.<br />

412. <strong>The</strong> literature reveals that normal risk premiums on executive stock options <strong>of</strong> similar<br />

securities with similar trading restrictions typically range from 3%-6%. At the far extreme range,<br />

for extremely risk-adverse executives who are also highly undiversified, this risk premium can range<br />

as high as 10%.<br />

413. Dr. Hakala's analysis in this case reveals that <strong>Enron</strong> executives rarely if ever exercised<br />

their options in a manner which exceeded this 10% threshold prior to the Class Period. By contrast,<br />

during the Class Period, this limit was continually exceeded. This analysis demonstrates defendants<br />

used and possessed inside, non-public information. In particular, as the Hakala Decl. details, many<br />

<strong>of</strong> the option exercises by Lay, Skilling, Pai and Rice exceed the 10% risk premium limitation which<br />

rationally bounds the limits <strong>of</strong> even a very risk-adverse, liquidity constrained executive.<br />

414. Dr. Hakala's analysis concludes that the option exercises <strong>of</strong> those defendants provides<br />

strong evidence that these insiders were trading on insider information, as no rational executive<br />

would have made these transactions absent the use <strong>of</strong> inside information.<br />

415. Dr. Hakala has also conducted a statistical analysis <strong>of</strong> defendants' trading patterns in<br />

this case. <strong>The</strong> results <strong>of</strong> his study demonstrate that there is less than 1 chance in 1000 that Lay, and<br />

less than 1 chance in 100 that other <strong>Enron</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers traded in a manner that was independent <strong>of</strong> the<br />

possession and use <strong>of</strong> material adverse non-public information. In other words, Dr. Hakala's study<br />

concluded that the probability that the <strong>Enron</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers traded on inside information is between 99%<br />

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