09.02.2013 Views

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Vinson & Elkins also knew because the hedged statements were prepared and reviewed by the<br />

lawyers and Vinson & Elkins gave opinions on them.<br />

629. For example, the Offering Documents for <strong>Enron</strong>'s zero coupon convertible notes, filed<br />

7/18/01, incorporated the following:<br />

Credit risk relates to the risk <strong>of</strong> loss that <strong>Enron</strong> would incur as a result <strong>of</strong> the<br />

nonperformance by counterparties pursuant to the terms <strong>of</strong> their contractual<br />

obligations. <strong>Enron</strong> maintains credit policies with regard to its counterparties that<br />

management believes significantly minimize overall credit risk. <strong>The</strong>se policies<br />

include an evaluation <strong>of</strong> potential counterparties' financial condition (including credit<br />

rating), collateral requirements under certain circumstances and the use <strong>of</strong><br />

standardized agreements which allow for the netting <strong>of</strong> positive and negative<br />

exposures associated with a single counterparty.<br />

* * *<br />

<strong>Enron</strong> does not anticipate any material impact to its financial position or results <strong>of</strong><br />

operations as a result <strong>of</strong> nonperformance <strong>of</strong> third parties on financial instruments<br />

related to non-trading activities.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se statements were incorporated in <strong>Enron</strong>'s Offering Documents for its securities <strong>of</strong>ferings in 00-<br />

01. <strong>The</strong> 00 10-K, incorporated in Offering Documents in 01, further represented that <strong>Enron</strong>'s total<br />

reserves for credit were only $452 million as <strong>of</strong> year-end 00.<br />

630. <strong>The</strong> statements above were false and misleading. <strong>Enron</strong>'s credit exposure in 00 due<br />

to the LJM2/Raptors transactions alone – over $250 million – was not reflected in the reserves. In<br />

01 <strong>Enron</strong>'s credit exposure due to the LJM2/Raptors transactions, alone, was over $500 million as<br />

<strong>of</strong> 4/01 and $1 billion as <strong>of</strong> 7/01. And, contrary to what was represented, <strong>Enron</strong>, its banks and<br />

Vinson & Elkins did anticipate a material impact to the Company's financial position due to <strong>Enron</strong>'s<br />

credit exposure. Indeed, from the fall <strong>of</strong> 00 to 01, <strong>Enron</strong>'s stock price was spiraling downward,<br />

piercing equity issues, and triggering massive credit exposure to the Company. <strong>The</strong> house <strong>of</strong> cards<br />

was crumbling before the eyes <strong>of</strong> those who engaged and participated in constructing it, so that they<br />

could protect hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>of</strong> fees, commissions and other charges.<br />

- 404 -

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!