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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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10% <strong>of</strong> the contract value as revenue at signing before any work had been completed was in direct<br />

violation <strong>of</strong> GAAP.<br />

I. <strong>Enron</strong>'s Improper Snowballing <strong>of</strong> Costs on Unsuccessful Bids<br />

580. During 97 and 98, <strong>Enron</strong> improperly capitalized, rather than expensed, costs<br />

associated with unsuccessful bids for projects. <strong>The</strong> project bid costs were then improperly included<br />

in bid costs for future projects. <strong>The</strong>se capitalized costs were ultimately written <strong>of</strong>f in the 1stQ 99,<br />

but to cloak the true nature <strong>of</strong> the writedown, the writedown was attributed to a "change in<br />

accounting."<br />

581. <strong>Enron</strong> International repeatedly deferred capital expenditures, including developer,<br />

financing, and promotional fees, that were incurred on failed project proposals. Former directors and<br />

vice presidents watched for more than five years – between 93 and 97 – while these deferred<br />

expenses were accumulated – a practice known company-wide by accounting and finance personnel<br />

as "snowballing" – and very few write-<strong>of</strong>fs were taken. Costs for South African projects involving<br />

oil and gas reserves, pipelines, and a plant designed to convert ore into another form <strong>of</strong> energy, and<br />

projects in China, among others, were snowballed quickly– the cash burn rate was as much as one<br />

million dollars a month. Quarter after quarter, year after year, <strong>Enron</strong> International "got pressure<br />

from corporate about meeting earnings," which made even a hint about write-downs – even when<br />

it was clear that the proposed project would never go forward – very unpopular at the end <strong>of</strong> a<br />

reporting period. Consequently, the snowball grew exponentially – so large that an international<br />

accounting <strong>of</strong>ficer told <strong>Enron</strong> CAO Causey that a writedown had to be taken because so many<br />

proposals were no longer even arguably viable. But this appropriate assessment ran counter to<br />

corporate directives by Causey, who, at Skilling's direction, routinely responded that "corporate<br />

didn't have room" to take a writedown – reduce the snowball – because doing so would bring <strong>Enron</strong>'s<br />

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