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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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536. Because the use <strong>of</strong> mark-to-market accounting requires the ability to make reasonable<br />

estimates <strong>of</strong> future income streams, longer term contracts such as <strong>Enron</strong>'s introduced more<br />

uncertainty into the estimate. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> Defendants improperly took full advantage <strong>of</strong> the fact that<br />

contracts that exceed four years could result in a wide range <strong>of</strong> fair value estimates and thus provide<br />

<strong>Enron</strong> with wide leeway in estimating the value <strong>of</strong> the contract. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Enron</strong> Defendants recorded<br />

income from these contracts even though they realized that once the contracts began to be performed,<br />

many would become losses because the cost, price and other assumptions were never valid to begin<br />

with. To avoid recording losses when it started to look like a deal was about to unfold, <strong>Enron</strong> would<br />

shift the curves – changed the estimate – to compensate for the anticipated loss, further misleading<br />

the shareholders. A former employee noted, "shifting the curve and making new deals to bury the<br />

losses from the past is constantly the strategy." Another former trader stated: "It was very simple.<br />

You just tweaked the assumptions on different variables, which were changed to make the return<br />

higher."<br />

537. When <strong>Enron</strong> employed mark-to-market accounting, the Company calculated a range<br />

<strong>of</strong> revenue and risk possibilities (i.e., a low revenue/low risk model, or a high revenue/high risk<br />

model). <strong>Enron</strong> consistently chose the high revenue/high risk model for nearly every deal, but<br />

because <strong>Enron</strong> moved debt, costs, losses, and liabilities <strong>of</strong>f its balance sheet through SPEs, this<br />

accumulation <strong>of</strong> risk was not disclosed to investors. For example, a former trader in <strong>Enron</strong> Global<br />

Markets was directed by his boss in the 4thQ 00 to show an extra $2 million in trading revenues for<br />

the quarter. To do this, they just increased the amount <strong>of</strong> money on an already booked deal for oil<br />

to be delivered in the future using mark-to-market accounting. This was called "moving the curve."<br />

This was altering the assumptions used to estimate income on contracts accounted for under mark-to-<br />

market. Moving the curve projection just 1% could mean millions in extra income. This abusive<br />

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