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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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and indeterminate outcomes <strong>of</strong> long-term contracts. This resulted in EES improperly and<br />

prematurely recognizing hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>of</strong> revenue that not only boosted its financial<br />

results, but allowed top EES managers and executives to collect huge bonuses based on these<br />

improperly inflated contract valuations.<br />

(g) EES was, in fact, losing hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> dollars on many <strong>of</strong> its retail<br />

energy contracts. To induce customers to enter into these agreements – so that <strong>Enron</strong> could claim<br />

its EES business was growing and succeeding – <strong>Enron</strong> had, in effect, "purchased" their participation<br />

by promising them unrealistic savings, charging low prices <strong>Enron</strong> knew would likely result in a loss,<br />

and spending millions <strong>of</strong> dollars in the short term to purchase purportedly more energy-efficient<br />

equipment, a significant portion <strong>of</strong> which costs <strong>Enron</strong> knew it was likely never to recover and<br />

certainly never to make a pr<strong>of</strong>it on. <strong>Enron</strong> executives knew that <strong>Enron</strong> would lose money on the<br />

EES deals, but had to make them more and more attractive to generate new clients, while the<br />

Company utilized unrealistic projections and mark-to-market accounting to mislead investors into<br />

believing that the EES contracts were making money. For instance:<br />

(i) EES had originally targeted residential retail customers, but this failed<br />

due to insurmountable hurdles, including the fact that <strong>Enron</strong> did not have sufficient infrastructure<br />

to bill residential customers monthly. In 97, <strong>Enron</strong> transformed EES into a commercial-industrial<br />

business and then purportedly signed up several major customers. However, EES still faced<br />

insurmountable hurdles: One, because each customer's contract was individualized, there were no<br />

economies-<strong>of</strong>-scale savings and the cost <strong>of</strong> performance precluded making a pr<strong>of</strong>it. Two, <strong>Enron</strong> still<br />

did not have sufficient infrastructure to do the monthly billing. Three, a prerequisite for each<br />

contract was for <strong>Enron</strong> to upgrade the customer's facilities with huge current capital expenditures,<br />

which was uneconomical and guaranteed losses on most contracts;<br />

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