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Enron Corp. - University of California | Office of The President

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• EBS employees knowledgeable about the technical challenges knew from the day the<br />

deal was announced that the fledgling EIN could not then – and probably never<br />

would be able to – deliver VOD as represented by <strong>Enron</strong>. In 6/00, Rice personally<br />

tried to recruit two EBS engineers, who had left <strong>Enron</strong> out <strong>of</strong> frustration over EBS<br />

problems, by telling them that they were essential because "we [<strong>Enron</strong>] can't deliver<br />

the Blockbuster deal."<br />

• While Blockbuster had the rights from Hollywood to supply videotapes, it did not<br />

have electronic-content distribution rights for movies. When <strong>Enron</strong> tried to<br />

convince Hollywood to grant Blockbuster the right to distribute digital video content,<br />

Hollywood refused. EBS never succeeded in persuading Hollywood to grant<br />

Blockbuster the requisite content rights. By mid-11/00, the reality was that<br />

Hollywood studios would not give DSL-quality content to Blockbuster. Thus, <strong>Enron</strong><br />

did not have one movie to <strong>of</strong>fer, let alone DSL quality.<br />

• While <strong>Enron</strong> announced that the Blockbuster deal test markets were a huge success<br />

in 12/00, <strong>Enron</strong> executives behind the scenes were directing the VOD team to revise<br />

and restructure the flawed business model because they knew it would never make<br />

money.<br />

(p) <strong>Enron</strong> represented that it successfully managed its balance sheet by effectively<br />

hedging its merchant investments and placing billions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>of</strong> non-recourse debt in related but<br />

independent parties. In fact, the hedges were illusory, not real, and were largely dependent on the<br />

value <strong>of</strong> <strong>Enron</strong>'s own stock where <strong>Enron</strong> still was exposed to the risk <strong>of</strong> its merchant investments.<br />

In fact, that debt was not non-recourse because if <strong>Enron</strong>'s credit rating was downgraded that debt<br />

would become recourse as to <strong>Enron</strong>. This was an extraordinarily dangerous situation for <strong>Enron</strong><br />

because, in fact, based upon its true financial condition, which was known to its insiders, <strong>Enron</strong> did<br />

not deserve the investment-grade credit rating it was carrying and it was in constant and precarious<br />

danger <strong>of</strong> losing that rating when the true structure <strong>of</strong> its <strong>of</strong>f-balance-sheet partnerships and SPEs<br />

became known and its true financial condition was revealed.<br />

(q) In fact, <strong>Enron</strong> did not deserve an investment-grade credit rating and did not<br />

have a solid or substantial financial structure because it was inflating the value <strong>of</strong> its assets by<br />

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