PHI LOS 0 P H Y . - Classic Works of Apologetics Online

38G
of tlJ{' Adl/lillistration of J:/stice.
th2t the detcrminat~0n of fvery caus~ should be left
to the conscience of the judge, unfette) ed by precedents
and authorities; since the very purpose for
which these are introduced, is to give a certainty to
judicial proceedings, which such proceedings would
want without them.
Now, to account fOl~
the existence of so manv sour-
~
ces of litigation, notwilhHanding the c1eame~s and
\ perfection of natural ju~tice, it sht l uld be observed, in
the first place, that treatisp's of mora:ity al\"\'ays sup-
. pose facts to lw ascertained; and not oniy so, but the
iRtention likewj-c of the parti'~f to be known and laid
bare. For example, \\"hen \\Yt:' pronount:e tllat promises
ought to be fulfilled, in that ~ense in which the
promiser apprehended, .at the tilne of making the
promi;e, the (lther party received 3nd undt'r~tood it,
tbe apprehensirm of one side, and the expt·ctation of
the other, must be d;scovered befor-~ thi~ rule can be
reduced to practice, or applied to the det~rnlination.
of any actual dispute. \Vherefore the di~cu ~5:ion of
facts~ whkh the mora!i .. t suppo~ei) to be s ..... ttled ; the
disco\·ery of intentioI1S, \\~tlich he pre:umt:s to be
k.no\\~n, stiii renlain to exercise the illquiry of courts
of justice. And as these facts and intentions are oft-
. en to be infcrred~ or rather conjectured, from obscure
indications, from suspiciou .. t!:.'~timony, or from
a comparison of opposite and contending probabilities,
they a iTo I d a nfvcr-failing supply of doubt and
litigation. For ,,·hi/. h reaSl)n, as hatll be:-·n obJ~ervfd
(in a former part of thi:, \\'ork.. th? ~:cicnce of 1T.10rality
J J.
I is to be considered rather as a direction to the parties,
who arc consciou"\ of their ()"~n th,-·u.:~hts, and
Illotives, and de~ ..:igns, to which con~civu:.ne5s the
teacher of morality constantly appeal,; than a~ a guide
to the judge, or to any third person, whose arbitration
mu~t proceeQ ppon rules of evidence, and maxims of
credibility, with which the moralist has nr> concern.
I Secondly. Th.ere exi~t cl multitude of cases, in
" Which the law of nature, that is, the law of public ex_
( pediency, pre!'cribes nothing, except that some eer
tain rule be adilered to, and that tl1c rule a~tually established
he. preserved; it either bein g indHferen