transport of dangerous goods and risk management - Kirilo SaviÄ

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TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 244That outbreak, completely unrelated to terrorism, gives some sense of the vulnerability of modern water systems tosimilar undetected, intentionally caused, contamination events.Sites involving water resources are vulnerable to environmental terrorist attacks in the form of explosives or theintroduction of poison or disease-causing agents. The damage is done by rendering the water unusable and/ordestroying the purification and supply infrastructure. The physical attributes of water resource sites that make themattractive to terrorists, or site weaknesses, are many. Most water infrastructure, such as dams, reservoirs, andpipelines are easily accessible to the public at various points. Many dams are tourist attractions. Pipelines are oftenexposed for long distances. Water and wastewater treatment plants dot our urban and rural landscape.The most traditional form of water-related terrorism involves physical attacks on water infrastructure – specificallywater-supply dams and pipelines. One such attack might target a large hydroelectric dam on a major river or a majorwater supply system for a city. Terrorists equipped with a relatively small conventional explosive might not be ableto cause serious structural damage to a massive dam. A major dam failure can kill thousands of people and evenmore modest damage might interrupt power generation or affect some other important watersystem operation(Gleick, 2006:491). Many municipal water systems have particularly vulnerable points, such as single largepipelines, pumping plants or treatment systems. The bombing of the major water pipeline entering Baghdad in 2003highlights such vulnerabilities (Tierney & Worth, 2003).Most biological pathogens cannot survive in water and most chemicals require very large volumes to contaminate awater system to any significant degree. Many pathogens and chemicals are vulnerable to the kinds of watertreatment used to make it potable for human use. Indeed, the whole purpose of municipal water systems is todestroy biological pathogens and reduce the concentration of harmful chemicals through chlorination, filtration,ultraviolet radiation, ozonation and many other common treatment approaches. Many contaminants are also brokendown over time by sunlight and other natural processes. Because of these safeguards, one early commentator noted:"it is a myth that one can accomplish [mass destruction] by tossing a small quantity of a ‘super-toxin’ into the watersupply. . .it would be virtually impossible to poison a large water supply: hydrolysis, chlorination and the requiredquantity of the toxin are the inhibiting factors" (Kupperman & Trent, 1979).A more modern infrastructure concern is the use of remote computers to attack valves, pumps and chemicalprocessing equipment though computer-based controls. If a group or individual could gain control over theautomated operations of water facilities, water supplies or quality could be seriously compromised. These controlsystems were typically developed with no attention to security. As a result, many of the supervisory control and dataacquisition (SCADA) networks used by water agencies to collect data from sensors and control equipment “may besusceptible to attacks and misuse” (Heilprin, 2005). There is growing recognition of this risk (Littleton, 1995). In1990, the United States issued National Security Decision Directive 42, which states in part:"Telecommunications and information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception, unauthorizedaccess and related forms of technical exploitation as well as other dimensions of the foreign intelligence threat. Thetechnology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is used extensively by foreign nations and can beemployed, as well, by terrorist groups and criminal elements" (National Security Directive, 1990).These risks are more than academic and theoretical. In Queensland, Australia, on 23 April 2000, police arrested aman for using a computer and radio transmitter to take control of the Maroochy Shire wastewater system andrelease sewage into parks, rivers and property. This is one of the first documented cases of cyber-terrorism in thewater industry (Gellman, 2002). Fears that Al-Quaida were seeking information on SCADA systems materialized in2002: “US law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that Al-Qaida members have soughtinformation on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems” (McDonnell & Meyer, 2002; MSNBC,2002).
Oil, gas and mineralsTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 245After September 11, 2001, many policymakers and industry experts focused increased attention on the system’svulnerability to intentional attack, accident or natural disaster. The nation’s energy system is a complex,interconnected web in which a disruption in one part of the infrastructure can easily cause disruptions elsewhere inthe system. Traditionally the focus of energy security has been on accidents and natural disasters. After September11, 2001, policymakers and industry have had to consider the threat of intentional damage to a much greater degreethan before.Now, energy security has become an important consideration for state legislatures. According to the NationalConference of State Legislatures the following are some particular aspects of the system infrastructure that remainvulnerable:1. the electricity system (nuclear facilities, non-nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel storage and transportation,electric transmission lines, electrical substations);2. petroleum (crude oil storage and transport, fuel oil, refineries, petroleum product pipelines and terminals,cyber security, telecommunications systems); and3. the natural gas system (natural gas storage facilities, natural gas pipelines) (Brown, Rewey & Gagliano,2003).Refineries, oil derricks, wellheads, pipelines, loading terminals, and tankers are all vulnerable to fire orconventional terrorist explosives. Attacks on this infrastructure can create extensive environmental damage beforebeing contained. In addition, oil spills can interfere with the normal workings of power stations and desalinationplants. A large, full oil tanker carries upwards of 38 million gallons of crude. If such a vessel suffered a terroristattack large enough to cause the loss of the bulk of its cargo, the environmental effects would be devastating. Byway of comparison, the Exxon-Valdez spill is estimated at 11 million gallons.Oil refineries are another critical part of the nation’s energy infrastructure. From a security perspective, the larger,more concentrated refineries may pose increased risks since an outage at one large refinery will have a moresignificant effect on the oil market than would an outage at a smaller refinery. The publicly available worst-casescenarios for a variety of refineries discuss serious health effects from huge releases of anhydrous ammonia.Anhydrous ammonia is explosive when mixed with air and can severely burn the skin, eyes and respiratory tract.Releases of anhydrous ammonia would threaten surrounding areas, including civilian populations, schools,shopping centers, hospitals and wildlife areas.Petroleum products are stored in large tank farms normally located near the population centers that serve as themarket for those products. Disruptions to these tank farms pose not only an economic threat to the markets theyserve but they are also a potential public safety and environmental hazard.Weaknesses of petroleum and mineral sites include the extensive and necessary infrastructure for processing andtransportation of the resource. An attack on a site where a strategic metal is mined (e.g., vanadium or tungsten) canalso cause economic damage.The natural gas system is subject to numerous vulnerabilities from production to distribution, but the natural gassystem is most vulnerable after the gas is compressed into high pressure form for transportation and storage. Gasstored or transported in this form is known as liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG terminals and storage facilities areusually above ground and visible, which may make them more vulnerable. LNG terminals store large amounts offuel, representing another vulnerability within the energy system.Oil pipelines in Colombia have regularly been the target of attack. In 1997, over 45 separate attacks on the CanoLimon-Covenas pipeline, reputedly by leftist guerrillas from the National Liberation Army (ELN), causedColombia’s national oil company Ecopetrol to declare force majeur on all exports from the Cano Limon field
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ISBN 978-86-83059-06-5Editor-in-Chi
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TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODSAND RIS
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EDITORIALLand transport Pan- Europe
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Contents:INTEGRATED MODEL AND INFOR
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TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RI
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Figure 3. Algorithm of Security Dat
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Figure 5. Algorithm of Ship Waste M
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Figure 7. Original Algorithm of Imp
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Figure 11. Original Algorithm of th
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Figure 13. Original Algorithm of th
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Figure 15. Original Algorithm of Ot
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Figure 18. The original algorithm o
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Figure 20. Original Algorithm of Ac
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Figure 23. Original Algorithm of In
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Table 1. Classification of waste th
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Table 3 Classification of waste tha
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Table 3b Classification of waste th
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Table 3d: Classification of waste t
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Table 3f: Classification of waste t
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Table 6 Classes of the compounds th
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Table 6b Classes of the compounds t
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Table 8. Typical hazardous waste ma
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Figure 5.- Life cycle for oiled sol
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Software part of Sledat systemTRANS
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BIBLIOGRAPHYTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS
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UDK:614.83:624.21TRANSPORT OF DANGE
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