Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Robot

CONCLUSION
how do we decipher others’ minds? 163
In this chapter, we have laid down a framework for integrating social cognition
to the neural substrate. This conception of action and emotion recognition
is based on the existence of neural networks subserving the various forms
of representation of an act of communication. Accordingly, each representation
entails a cortical/subcortical network of interconnected neural structures.
According to the simulation theory, these networks become activated
as a consequence of the simulation of the represented actions and emotions
by the selves who are engaged in the act of communication. As we have
argued, this theory relies on the fact that simulation of one’s own actions
(e.g., in motor images) or of others’ actions produces a subliminal activation
of some of the areas normally devoted to action execution (Jeannerod, 2001).
Another feature of the theory is that, although these networks are clearly
distinct from one form of representation to another (e.g., the representation
of a self-generated action versus the representation of an action observed
or predicted from another agent), they partly overlap. When two agents
socially interact with one another, this overlap creates shared representations
(i.e., activation of neural structures that are common to several modalities
of representation). In normal conditions, however, the existence of nonoverlapping
parts as well as possible differences in intensity of activation
between the activated zones allow each agent to discriminate between representations
activated from within (for a self-generated intention or emotional
state) and those activated from without (by an action or an emotion displayed
by another agent) and to disentangle which belongs to the self from which
belongs to the other. This process would thus be the basis for correctly
attributing a representation to the proper agent or, in other words, for
answering the question of “who” is the author of the act of communication
(Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998; Jeannerod, 1999).
The flow chart of Figure 6.1 is a tentative illustration of the many interactions
between two agents. Each agent builds in the brain a representation
of both his or her own intended actions, using internal cues like beliefs and
desires, and the potential actions of the other agent with whom he or she
interacts. These partly overlapping representations are used by each agent
to build a set of predictions and estimates about the social consequences of
the represented actions, if and when they are executed. Indeed, when an
action comes to execution, it is perceived by the other agent as a set of social
signals which confirm (or not) predictions and possibly modify beliefs
and desires.
This conception allows hypotheses about the nature of the dysfunction
responsible for misattribution of actions by schizophrenic patients. Changes