Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Robot

374 conclusions
much of my behavior in the opening anecdote. If neither biology nor feeling
remains, can we say that such a robot has emotions? In a related vein, reinforcement
learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998) has established itself as being of
great value in the study of machine learning and artificial neural networks.
However, when are we justified in seeing positive reinforcement at the psychological/emotional
level rather than being simply a mathematical term in
a synaptic adjustment rule?
Appraisal theory (as in Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) develops a catalog
of human emotions and seeks to provide a computational account of the
appraisals which lead to invocation of one emotion over another. I suggest
that robot emotions may partake of some aspects of the appraisal approach
to emotions but without the “heat” provided by their biological underpinnings
in humans. If it is part of the job of a robot to simulate the appearance
of human emotional behavior to more effectively serve human needs, then
it may (as suggested earlier) incorporate a model of human emotions within
its circuitry, and this may well be appraisal-based. It might then be a matter
of terminology as to whether or not one would wish to speak of such a robot
having emotions. However, I think a truly fruitful theory of robot emotions
must address the fact that many robots will not have a human–computer
interface in which the expression of human-like emotional gestures plays a
role. Can one, then, ascribe emotions to a robot (or for that matter an animal
or collective of animals) for which empathy is impossible?
Perhaps a more abstract view of emotion is required if we are to speak
of robot emotions.
To this end, I must first deliver on my promise to provide an abstraction
of the notion of ecological niche suitable for robots. In the case of animals,
we usually refer to the part of the world where the animal is to make
a living. However, locale is not enough. Foodstuffs that are indigestible to
one species may be the staff of life to another, the size of the creature can
determine where it can find a suitable resting place, and different creatures
in a given environment may have different predators. A new species in an
environment may create new ecological niches there for others. In biology,
the four Fs (feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction) are paramount, and
it is success in these that defines the animal’s relation to its environment.
However, none of this applies to most robots. One can certainly imagine
scenarios in which the “struggle for fuel” plays a dominant role in a robot
economy, but robot design will normally be based on the availability of a
reliable supply of electricity. Although the study of self-reproducing machines
is well established (von Neumann, 1966; Arbib, 1966), the reproduction
of robots will normally be left to factories rather than added to the
robot’s own workload. Thus, the ecological niche of a robot will not be defined
in terms of general life functions as much as in a set of tasks that it is