Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Robot

370 conclusions
he sees as the state that arises by virtue of having the ability to think about
one’s own thoughts and analyze long, multistep syntactic plans. He aligns himself
implicitly with Fellous and LeDoux when he says that another building
block for such planning operations may be the type of short-term memory
(i.e., working memory) provided by the prefrontal cortex. The type of working
memory system implemented in the dorsolateral and inferior convexity of
the prefrontal cortex of nonhuman primates and humans (Goldman-Rakic,
1996) could provide mechanisms essential to forming a multiple-step plan.
However, as I have commented earlier, the prefrontal cortex involves a variety
of working memories, some of which have no direct relation either to consciousness
or to emotion.
The model of thought that emerges here sees each mental state as combining
emotional and cognitive components. While in some cases one component
or the other may be almost negligible, it seems more appropriate,
on this account, to see the emotional states as being continually present and
varying, rather than as intermittent. The model also sees physiological states
and emotion as inextricably intertwined—a cognitive state may induce an
emotional reaction, but a prior emotional state may yield a subconscious
physiological residue that influences the ensuing unfolding of cognitive and
emotional states.
Adolphs (Chapter 2) stresses the important role of social interaction in
the forming of emotions. Clearly, human emotions are greatly shaped by our
reactions to the behavior of other people. Returning once more to the OED,
Empathy: The power of projecting one’s personality into (and so fully
comprehending) the object of contemplation. (This term was apparently
introduced to English in 1909 by E. B. Titchener Lect. Exper.
Psychol. Thought-Processes: “Not only do I see gravity and modesty
and pride . . . but I feel or act them in the mind’s muscles. This is, I
suppose, a simple case of empathy, if we may coin that term as a
rendering of Einfühlung.”
We find a definition which carries within itself the simulation theory discussed
by Jeannerod in Chapter 6, but with “the mind’s muscles” transformed
into the mirror system, which is a network of neurons active both when the
“brain owner” acts in a certain way and when he or she observes another acting
in a similar fashion. Earlier, we outlined a number of intermediate stages in
the evolution of mechanisms that support language. I suggest that, similarly,
a number of stages would have to intervene in the evolution of the brain
mechanisms that support emotion and empathy. However, this topic and
the related issue of the extent to which there has been a synergy between
the evolution of language and the evolution of empathy are beyond the scope
of the present chapter.